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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j)
(1953), as amended.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented for resolution are as follows:
ISSUE 1:

Election of Remedies Issue:
Whether the trial court erred by failing to
recognize that plaintiff by affirming the contractual transaction which
contained an integration clause, thereby retaining the benefits of the bargain
and not avoiding the fraudulently induced contract, elected certain remedies
and was, therefore, precluded from recovering damages beyond a breach of the
terms of the contract.

Standard of Review:

The application of law to facts poses a question of law,

which this Court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's
conclusions. Zoll & Branch, P.C. v. Asav ° ° ^

y

): State v. Pena, 869 P.

2d (Utah 1994); Bonhanr

re Adoption of A.B.,

1999UTApp. 315, 991 P.

38,Tfl4-15, 986P.2d

115; DeLand v. Uintah Cou.

.57).

The issue was preserv
12), and was specifically addr
ISSUE 2:

Excessive Puniti
to remit the pur
following two coi
(i)

:ript(f,T.T.M) at 11-

a

rt erred by failing
__ w/uent than remitted on the
alternative grounds:

The trial court erred by failing to aggregate the amount of punitive
damages applicable to all defendants before applying a ratio of actual
fraud damages to punitive damages and thereby exceeded the ratio of
1 to 3 (or 1 to 2 as may be appropriate). The ratio of actual fraud
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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damages which the trial court ultimately remitted the judgment to was
1 to 14.75, which is a ratio that still has the amount of punitive damages
5 to 8 times greater than it should be under applicable law. The
aggregate punitive damages were remitted to $1,052,757.00. The
actual fraud damages were $71,336.00. [$1,052,757.00 - $71,336.00
= 14.757724.]
(ii)

The trial court erred by failing to remit the punitive damages in an
additional amount inasmuch as the facts of the matter attributing
punitive damages do not justify a ratio of actual fraud damages to
punitive damages of greater than 1 to 3 (or 1 to 2 as may be
appropriate).

Standard of Review:

A determination of whether or not the trial court

appropriately remitted the amount of a judgment in conformance with standards set by the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah is determined under an abuse of discretion standard and
correctness standard. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P. 2d 937, 938 (Utah
1993), where the claim made on appeal was that the trial court failed to apply the standards
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court for the remittitur of excessive punitive damages when
a jury had determined punitive damages that were greater than 3 (or 2) times the amount of
the actual damages.
The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (Record ("R.") at 1631), and was
specifically addressed by the trial court Def. Memorandum in Support of Motion for New
Trial, (R. at 1629).
ISSUE 3:

/

Double Recovery Issue: Whether the trial court erred when it allowed the
jury to determine punitive damages separately for defendant Richard M.
Knapp and defendant University Properties, Inc., when the evidence showed
that University Properties, Inc., was an entity owned almost entirely by
defendant, officer and employee, Richard M. Knapp and the actions of the
entity were entirely the actions of defendant, officer and employee, Richard M.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Knapp? In other words, whether the trial court allowed an impermissible
double recovery by allowing the plaintiff to recover punitive damages from the
employer (University Properties, Inc.; $214,000.00)) for the acts of the officer
and employee (Richard M. Knapp; $500,000.00), to whom punitive damages
were also assessed?
Standard of Review:

The application of law to facts poses a question of law,

which this Court reviews for correctness and without deference to the lower court's
conclusions. Zoll & Branch. P.C. v. Asav. 932 P. 2d 592 (Utah 1997); Statev.Pena, 869 P.
2d (Utah 1994); Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P. 2d 497 (Utah 1989); In re Adoption of A.B.,
1999 UT App. 315, 991 P. 2d 70; State ex rel. H.J.. 1999 UT App. 238, ^14-15, 986 P.2d
115; DeLand v. Uintah County. 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (R. at 1741) and was specifically
addressed by the trial court (R. at 1774)
ISSUE 4:

Admissibility of Evidence Issue: Whether the trial court erred by failing to
allow evidence of the resale of the property and defendant Knapp's tender of
recission? Evidence of the resale of the property would have allowed the jury
to see that the purchase of the property that the defendant fraudulently induced
the plaintiff to purchase ultimately redounded to the plaintiffs financial
benefit. Evidence of a tender of recission would demonstrate the defendant
Knapp's good faith.

Standard of Review:

The selection, interpretation and application of a particular

rule of evidence are reviewed under the correction of error standard and without deference
to the lower court's conclusions. Utah Department of Transportation v. 6200 South
Associates, 872 P. 2d 462, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). When the rule of evidence requires
the balancing of factors then an abuse of discretion standard applies. Id., See also. Carpet
Barn v. State of Utah, 786 P. 2d 770 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990).
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The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (R. at 1854), and was specifically
addressed by the trial court Def. Memorandum in Support of Motion for New Trial(Re:
Excluded Evidence)(R at 1854).
ISSUE 5:

Release of Judgment Lien Issue: Does a supersedeas bond provide adequate
security under Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1, in order to terminate a judgment
lien?

Standard of Review:

The selection, interpretation and application of statutes

are reviewed under the correction of error standard and without deference to the lower
court's conclusions. Utah Department of Transportation v. 6200 South Associates, 872 P.
2d 462, 464 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court (R. at 23 31), and was specifically
addressed by the trial court. Def. Motion For Order Terminating Judgment Lien (R. at 2331)
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
1.

With Regard to Issue 1 (Election of Remedies Issue):

This issue is a

matter of first impression in the Utah Supreme Court. The determination of this matter will
be a subject of common law.
2.

With Regard to Issue 2 (Excessive Punitive Damages Issue):

United States Constitution, Amendment XIV:
...[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sec. 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due precess of
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law.
3.

With Regard to Issue 3 (Double Recovery Issue):

The determination of

this matter will be a subject of common law.
4.

With Regard to Issue 4 (Admissibility of Evidence Issue): The

determination of this matter will be a subject of common law.
5.

With Regard to Issue 5 (Release of Judgment Lien Issue):

Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(5) provides as follows:
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit with the court where
the notice of appeal is filed of cash or other security in a form and amount
considered sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the
full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other
anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal, the
lien created by Subsection (2) shall be terminated as provided in Subsection
(5)(b).
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection
(5)(a), the court shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the
judgment under Subsection (2) and granting the judgment creditor a perfected
lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original judgment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(Introduction)
This is an appeal from a judgment (Copy attached as Appendix A) Fourth District
Court, Provo Department, Honorable James R. Taylor, District Court Judge, presiding with
a jury, rendered after trial whereupon a judgment was entered in favor of appellee Diversified
Holdings, L. C. ("Diversified"), against appellants and cross-appellees Richard M. Knapp,
University Properties, Inc., a Utah Corporation, and the Haws Companies, a Utah
Corporation, dba the Haws Companies Real Estate Services (collectively referred to as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"Knapp"). The jury rendered its verdict whereupon the trial court, acting on motion, granted
a remittitur of the punitive damages and negligence damages or, in the alternative, a new trial
for Diversified. Div rsified choose to accept the remittitur. Knapp appealed. Diversified
cross appealed. Knapp asserts in this appeal that: (i) Diversified is not entitled to damages
for fraud as a matter of law inasmuch as Diversified affirmed the voidable contract under
which it sought damages and (ii) if punitive damages are appropriate, that the amount of
punitive damages granted remain excessive even though the trial court granted a remittitur.
Diversified asserts in its cross appeal that the jury award ought to be reinstated.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts is hereby made to aid the court. The statement is
made with issues of fact decided in favor of the Diversified, which prevailed below.
A.

Defendant University Properties ("University"), acting through defendant

Richard Knapp ("Knapp") and the plaintiff Diversified Holdings ("Diversified") entered into
negotiations for the purchase by Diversified of a parcel of improved real property from
University that University expected to purchase from First Security Bank. Knapp was an
officer and 90% owner of University.(R. at 2079) Turner, a licenced real estate salesman
acted as the real estate salesman for the sale transaction between Diversified and University.
Knapp was also a licenced as a real estate salesman.(T.T. at 339) However, Knapp did not
disclose to Diversified that he was a licenced real estate salesperson whereas Turner at all
times acted as a real estate sales person. (Id.)
6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

B.

University was in the process of purchasing the real property from First

Security Bank.(T.T. at 204-306) The property, an office building, was in foreclosure sale by
First Security Bank.(T.T. at 62-63) Knapp arranged for the purchase of the property by his
company, University, for $700,000.00.(T.T. at 59). Turner represented to Diversified that
the price at which University would sell the property to Diversified would be $10,000.00
greater than what University was to pay for the property from First Security Bank. (T.T. at
61) When asked, Turner feigned a lack of knowledge about the purchase price that
University was to buy the property from First Security Bank and then pretended to call
Knapp (Knapp was not on the other end of the telephone line) to set the re-sale price to
Diversified.Qd.) Turner then told Diversified that the price at which University would sell
the property to Diversified was $785,000.00.(T.T. at 62-63)
C.

Knapp became aware prior to the sale of the property by University to

Diversified that Turner had told Diversified that the price for the property of $785,000.00
was $10,000.00 over the price that University purchased the property from First Security
Bank. Knapp did not correct the error, hoping that Diversified would not discover that the
price from First Security Bank to University was $700,000.00.(T.T. at 333-340)
D.

Diversified and University entered into a Earnest Money agreement for the

purchase of the property by Diversified. (T.T. at 66-67) The Ernest Money Agreement
between University and Diversified provided that the sales price would be $785,000.00 and
contained the following language:

7
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Paragraph L:
COMPLETE AGREEMENT-NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument
constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and
cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral
agreements which modify or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot
be changed except by mutual agreement of the parties.
(Id. Exhibit 13)(Emphasis added)[A copy of the Earnest Money Agreement is attached as
Appendix C ]
E.

Immediately after University obtained ownership of the property the property

was resold to Diversified for the price of $785,000.00, as was provided for in the Earnest
Money Agreement which was agreed to by University and Diversified.(T.T. at 72-73)
F.

Upon sale, Knapp (and University) and Turner then split the profits from the

sale of the real property which was the difference between the $700,000.00 which University
purchased the property from First Security Bank and the $785,000.00 they sold the property
to Diversified.(T.T. at 81)
G.

There was no testimony or evidence of any corporate act of University taken

by any person other than Knapp, who was an employee of University and its 90%
shareholder.^, at 2079, T.T. at 304)
H.

Haws Companies ("Haws") was the real estate broker for Turner and Knapp

and failed to supervise them at the time of the transaction and further failed to rectify the
situation upon Haws discovery of the problem.(R. at 2075-2076)
I.

Subsequently, Diversified learned that the property had been sold to University
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by First Security Bank for $700,000.00. (T.T. at 79) Diversified learned that a wrong had
been committed on it "within a couple of weeks afer closing." (Id.) At that time Diversified
choose to affirm the sale of the property from University to Diversified and not rescind the
transaction, which Diversified believed was it was fraudulently induced to enter. (R. at 1854)
Consequently, Diversified retained the property and at the same time sued University,
Knapp, Turner and Haws for fraud, claiming to be improperly induced into the purchase of
the property. (Complaint; R. at 11)
J.

The jury was not allowed to hear testimony that Diversified (by a successor)

took the property that it had purchased in June 1992 for $785,000.00 and sold it in May 1996
for $1,200,000.00.(T.T. at 11-12) Further, the jury was precluded from hearing testimony
that Knapp's tender of recission of the transaction was refused.(T.T. at 11-12)
K.

Based upon the foregoing, the jury initially awarded the following damages to

Diversified:

•

f*5 Q

1

f.
Total (b+c+e)

Defendant

Fraud

Turner

$71,336.00

$2,250,000.00

30.6 to 1

$84,000.00

$2,405,336.00

Knapp

$71,336.00

$1,750,000.00

23.8 to 1

$73,500.00

$1,821,336.00

University

$71,336.00

$1,000,000.00

13.6 to 1

$-0-

$1,071,000.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$130,500.00

1.7 to 1

$52,500.00

$254,336.00

1 Total:

[ $71,336.00

$5,130,500.00

69.8 to 1

$210,000.00

$5,411,836.00

o

Punitive

e.
Negligence

-0

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.
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(R. at 1657-1658)
The jury also determined the amount of a civil penalty based on the actions of the parties as
follows:
EFENDANT

AMOUNT OF PENALTY

Knapp

$60,946.00

University

$-0-

Turner

$41,502.00

Haws

$4,200.00

TOTAL:

$106,648.00

The statute under which these penalties are rendered is Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11. (R. at
2093) Diversified elected to forego the statutory penalties in lieu of the punitive damages
awarded. (Id.)
L.

The trial court judge reviewed the matter on a motion for new trial and remitted

the judgment, offering Diversified a new trial or to accept the remitted judgment. The
judgment in favor of Diversified and against the defendant's below was entered as follows:

f.

~~1

Defendant

b.
Fraud2

c.
Punitive

d.
Ratio
©tob)

e.
Negligence

Total (b+c+e)

Turner

$71,336.00

$208,257.00

2.9 to 1

$26,000.00

$305,593.00

Knapp

$71,336.00

$500,000.00

7tol

$22,750.00

$594,086.00 1

University

$71,336.00

$214,000.00

3tol

$-0-

2

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.
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$285,336.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$130,500.00

1.8 to 1

$16,250.00

$218,086.00

Total:

$71,336.00

$1,052,757.00

14.75 to 1

$65,000.00

$1,403,101.00

Memorandum Decision (R. at 2072-2097) Interest was also allocated to the damages.
M.

In granting the remittitur, Judge Taylor justified the amount of the remitted

awards as follows: [A copy of the Memorandum Decision, June 12,2000, is attached hereto
as Appendix A]
(1)

With regard to negligence:

Judge Taylor reviewed the evidence before

him and concluded that the judgment against Turner ($84,000.00), Knapp
($73,500.00) and Haws ($52,500.00) totaling $210,000.00 should be remitted
to Turner ($26,000.00), Knapp ($22,750.00) and Haws ($16,250.00) totalling
$65,000.00 based upon the following:
•

The negligence "resulted in the failure of the defendants [Turner,
Knapp and Haws] to professionally represent the Plaintiff as real estate
professionals to obtain the most reasonable price possible for the
property." (R. at 2095)

•

If the purchase price from First Security Bank had been $650,000.00
(some evidence was presented that was a possible value of the property)
then the difference between that amount and the amount paid
($785,000.00) would have been $135,000.00, but $70,000.00 of that
amount would have been attributed by the jury to fraud, leaving only
$65,000.00 in remaining damages that could be attributed to
negligence. Id. No other evidence of damage was presented to the
jury. (Id.)

•

,f

' [Additional damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate
result of negligence5 cannot, therefore be sustained beyond the amount
of$65,000.00."(Id.)
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•

The amount was allocated between Turner, Knapp and Haws.(R. at
2094)

[The Knapp appellants do not challenge the negligence award as remitted.]
(ii)

With Regard to the punitive damages awarded in favor of Diversified and
against Knapp in the amount of $1,750,000.00 the trial court concluded that
a remittitur was appropriate remitting the amount to $500,000.00 based upon
the following:
•

"Knapp was the most wealthy of the [defendants ]."(R. at 2081)

•

"Knapp knowingly initiated and took advantage of the scheme to
defraud [Diversified]."(Id.)

•

"The circumstances surrounding the conduct were manipulated and
utilized by Mr. Knapp to facilitate the fraud."(Id.)

•

"Diversified was forced to spend more on the property than it wanted."

(MO
•

"Knapp and his business interests . . . are largely unaffected." (Id.)

•

"Unless forced to change his business practices and outlook there is a
substantial possibility that Mr. Knapp will seek to take advantage of
similar circumstances in the future." (Id.)

*

"Mr. Knapp accomplished much of the fraud in this case by creating
and manipulating special relationships — particularly with other
defendants." (Id.)

•

"Damages awarded by the jury as compared to punitive damages were
in the ratio of about 1 to 19 which substantially exceeds the Supreme
Court guidelines." (Id.)

•

Punitive damages are to be remitted to $500,000.00. That creates a
ratio of punitive damages to actual damages of 5.3 to 1. To arrive at
that ratio the court aggregated the fraud damages of $71,336.00 (which
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is joint and several with Turner and Knapp) with the negligence
damages of $22,500.00. (Id.)
With Regard to the punitive damages awarded in favor of Diversified and
against University in the amount of $1,000,000.00 the trial court concluded
that a remittitur was appropriate and remitted the amount to $214,000.00
based upon the following:
•

The value of University was unknown but was included in the net
worth of Knapp. (R. at 2079)

•

University took all its actions through Knapp. (R. at 2078)

•

The ratio of punitive damages to actual damages rendered by the jury
was 14 to 1 and was excessive. (Id.)

•

"[T]he misbehavior of the corporation completely resulted from the
mis-deeds of Mr. Knapp.1' (R. at 2077)

•

Punitive damages to actual damages are to be remitted to the ratio of
3 to 1. (Id.) To arrive at that ratio the fraud damages of $71,336.00
(which is joint and several with Turner and Knapp) were used solely
inasmuch as there were no negligence damages awarded against
University. (Id.)

With Regard to the punitive damages awarded in favor of Diversified and
against Haws in the amount of $130,000.00 the trial court concluded that a
remittitur was not appropriate and retained the amount awarded by the jury of
$130,000.00 based upon the following:
•

"Although the conduct of the Haws Companies was, at the time of the
actual fraud, relatively benign and without malice, the company did not
take advantage of the opportunity to correct the error but, instead acted
to protect it's 'fee position' by seeking to collect real estate
commissions and fire the agents [Turner and Knapp]."(R. at 2074)
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•

(v)

Punitive damages to actual damages was a ratio of 1.5 to 1 .(Id.) To
arrive at that ratio the fraud damages of $71,336.00 (which is joint and
several with Turner and Knapp) were aggregated with the negligence
damages of $16,250.00. (R. at 2077)

With Regard to the punitive damages awarded in favor of Diversified and
against Turner in the amount of $2,250,000.00 the trial court concluded that
a remittitur was appropriate and remitted the amount to $208,257.00 based
upon the following:
•

"Mr. Turner appears to be the least wealthy of any of the Defendants."
(R. at 2093)

•

"No evidence was presented ... identifying any net worth of Mr.
Turner." Qd.)

•

"Mr. Turner's conduct ... was the core of the fraud that was
perpetrated." (R. at 2092)

•

Mr. Turner lied to Diversified. (Id.)

•

Mr. Turner was a licenced real estate agent. (Id.)

•

" [Virtually all of the deception that occurred... was carried out through
the lies, statements and activity of Mr. Turner acting by himself or in
concert with other defendants." (R. at 2091)

•

Punitive damages to actual damages was a ratio of to 2 to l.(Id.) To
arrive at that ratio the fraud damages of $71,336.00 (which is joint and
several with Haws, University and Knapp) were aggregated with the
negligence damages of $26,000.00. (R. at 2077)

Diversified chose not to retry the matter and accepted the remittitur. (R.)
M.

Supersedeas bonds were obtained from the Travelers Casualty and Security

Company of America to secure the judgment as remitted against defendants\appellants
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Richard M. Knapp, University Properties, Inc., The Haws Companies, dba The Haws
Companies Real Estate Services.(R. at 2140,2146). Copies of the bonds are attached hereto
as Exhibit "A."

3

Those bonds were submitted to the court, signed by an attorney in fact for

the bonding company, became part of the Court record below (R. at 2140, 2146) and
provided as follows:
•

"[Defendant and Travelers] are firmly held and bound unto Diversified
Holdings, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, in the full and just sum of
[the amount] for the payment of which, well and truly to be made, we and each
of us bind ourselves, our successors, and assigns, jointly and severally, firmly
by these presents." (Id.)

N.

After objections were raised by Diversified that the bonds did not provide

sufficient dollar coverage, the bonds were increased to cover the judgment amount and
interest thereon.(R. at 2225-2235) Copies of the Increase Certificates by which the amount
of the bonds were increased are attached hereto as Exhibit "B."

3

A concise chronology of relevant events is as follows:

D A T E jmmmmmmmMMMMmmi

' EVENT

June 23, 2000

Notice of Submission of Bonds filed; Supersedeas bonds submitted by
defendants Knapp, University and Haws

June 27, 2000

Objection to Supersedeas Bond submitted by plaintiffs

July 25, 2000

Judgment entered

Sept. 8, 2000

Notice of Submission of Increased Supersedeas Bond filed: Increased
Supersedeas bonds submitted by defendants Knapp, University and Haws

Sept. 12, 2000

Ruling; Trial court found that the Supersedeas Bonds, "as prepared and
filed, are appropriate. The Objection to the form of the bonds [was]
overruled."

Dec. 13, 2000

Order Terminating Judgment Lien entered.
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O.

The trial court concluded (Ruling dated September 12,2000, a copy of which

is attached hereto as Exhibit "C") that the judgment had been properly secured by way of the
supersedeas bonds, such bonds being in a form and amount considered sufficient by the trial
court, which had rendered the judgment in this matter.
P.

No objection to the adequacy or sufficiency of the bonds were made below at

the hearing on the Motion for Order Terminating Judgment Lien or in any effort to have the
supersedeas bonds approved by the trial court, other than for the amount of the bonds, which
was corrected by the Increase Certificates.(R.)
Q.

Knapp, University and Haws moved the trial court pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§78-22-1 (5) for an Order terminating the judgment lien created by the remitted judgment that
had already been secured by the supersedeas bond.4 Def. Motion For Order to Terminate
Judgment Lien (R. at 2349) That Motion was granted by the trial court finding that
[the trial] Court has previously determined that the Judgment herein . . . has
been properly secured by way of supersedeas bonds filed herein, such bonds
having been previously determined as being . . . in a form and amount
considered sufficient by this Court, which had rendered the judgment in this
matter...."Order Terminating Judgment Lien (R. at 2354)
A true and correct copy of the Order Terminating Judgment Lien is attached hereto as
Exhibit "D."

4

The Motion asks that the lien specifically be released for certain property
located in Summit County, State of Utah, inasmuch as the need for the release of that
property is eminent. The release of all other liens is also effected by the Order
Terminating Judgment Lien.
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DETAILED AND MARSHALED STATEMENT OF FACTS
A detailed statement of facts in supplementation of the foregoing Concise Statement
of Facts is as follows: See Appendix "B" and incorporated herein by reference.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Re: Election of Remedies:

In this matter, the Court has the opportunity to

determine a matter of first impression for this Court on whether or not an affirmed
fraudulently induced contract containing a merger clause can be the basis for fraud and
punitive damages. When Diversified choose (as was its right to do) to affirm the underlying
contract certain consequences resulted from that choice. One of those consequences is that
Diversified by accepting the contract also accepted the terms of the contract which included
a clause that disclaimed any liability for any representation made in the course of entering
into the contract, including any misrepresentation. That was a freely made choice of
Diversified. Diversified could have just as easily chosen to declare the contract void and
sought recission and thereby have all the remedies for fraud. However, weighting the
alternatives, Diversified sought to enforce the contract. Knapp had no say in the course that
Diversified choose. But once having made that choice, Diversified cannot now pick and
choose which provisions to enforce and which top ignore. The contract contained the
provision that the "instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and
supersedes and cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings or agreements between the parties." As such, there can be no recognizable
claim for fraud in this matter.
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claim for fraud in this matter.
Re: Excessive Punitive Damages:

If a fraud claim can be recog\nized by the

court in this matter, the punitive damages rendered by the jury as reduced by the court
through remittitur remain beyond the limits as established by guidelines of this Court and the
United States Supreme Court, and therefore, are in violation of due process. Punitive
damages must be reasonable. In this case the punitive damages in their remitted form are
still significantly higher than what this Court has concluded is reasonable. If punitive
damages are to be awarded they should be in the range of two times the actual damages, or
a total of $142,672.00 [$71,336 x 2 = $142,672.00], not the $1,052,757.00.
Re: Double Recovery:

Richard Knapp and his employer, University Properties

(which Richard Knapp is a 90% owner) were both sued in the this matter. University
operated solely through Richard Knapp in this matter. Nonetheless, a judgment was rendered
against Richard Knapp for punitive damages in a separate and distinct amount and another
judgment was rendered against University for punitive damages for another separate and
distinct amount. The authorities are clear that when an entity acts only passively and only
through the wrongdoing employee that there should only be one recovery, not two separate
recoveries. Consequently, the judgment against University needs to be merged into the
judgment against Richard Knapp and no further recovery obtained other tthan the amount
against Richard Knapp.
Re: Failure to Receive Evidence:

The jury was not allowed to receive some

very important information at trial. That information would have allowed the jury to see
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what, if any effect the "fraud" had on Diversified. The evidence would have shown that the
wrongdoing had a substantial positive financial benefit to Diversified. Further, it would have
shown that given the chance to nrescind and receive its money back, Diversified choose to
stay with the deal it had struck, ultimately to its benefit.
Re: Release of Judgment Lien: Utah statutory law provides for the release of a
judgment lien when the judgment is sufficiently secured. The supersedeas bonds procured
in this matter provide that adequate security and, therefore, allow the trial court to release the
judgment lien on real property.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

DIVERSIFIED, HAVING CHOSEN TO AFFIRM THE ERNEST
MONEY AGREEMENT THAT CONTAINED A MERGER CLAUSE,
IS PRECLUDED AS A MATTER OF LAW FROM RECOVERY
UNDER ANY TORT THEORIES.

This case is a matter of first impression in Utah on the topic of the effect of a merger
clause on an affirmed, but fraudulently induced, contract. Other jurisdictions have addressed
this situation. In those other jurisdictions the courts have concluded that when a party
affirms a fraudulently induced contract that party remains bound by the terms of that contract
and does not retain tort remedies for the inducement to enter the agreement. In other words,
there are consequences associated with the affirmation of the agreement that are different
from the consequences surrounding the voiding or disaffirming of the agreement. One
consequence is that the affirmed agreement carries no tort (i.e. fraud) remedy.
A chart that graphically depicts the analysis contained in this section of the brief is
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attached hereto as Appendix D. We suggest that a reference to that chart will be of great help
to the Court.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate to the Court that the fraud judgment
rendered in favor of Diversified and against the appellants should be set aside in its entirety
— Diversified affirmed the agreement and received exactly what the affirmed agreement
provided.
A,

Diversified affirmed the Ernest Money Agreement which contained a
merger clause.

In an action for fraud, the plaintiff has "the option to elect to rescind the transaction
and recover the purchase price or to affirm the transaction and recover damages." Dugan v.
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980); see also Gardner v. Little. 2000 WL 137133, *3
(Miss. App. Feb. 8, 2000). "[SJtated in general terms, ... assuming the fact of fraud, a
contract obligation obtained by fraudulent representation is not void, but voidable. Upon
discovery thereof, the one defrauded must act promptly and finally to repudiate the
agreement; however, a continuance to ratify the contract terms constitutes a waiver." Id. In
the present case, Diversified never repudiated or dis-affirmed the agreement, but rather
chose to affirm the transaction and keep all the benefits of the bargain..
Diversified knew of the wrongdoing perpetuated on it within just a couple of weeks
of the closing of the property. Yet Diversified did nothing to avoid the contract. To the
contrary, Diversified assumed complete and full ownership of the property. By affirming the
transaction, Diversified was affirming the underlying contract, the Ernest Money Agreement.
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Paragraph L of the Ernest Money Agreement states:
COMPLETE AGREEMENT - NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument
constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and
cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties,
understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral
agreements which modify or affect this agreement. This Agreement cannot
be changed except by mutual agreement of the parties.
(Emphasis added.) This paragraph is commonly referred to as a "merger clause" or an
"integration clause." When a party chooses to affirm a contract that party, in essence,
declares a willingness to be bound by the contract, and can enforce the contract and recover
damages for breach of the contract. By affirmation the party does not pick and choose what
provisions of the contract are to be enforceable and which are not. The contract is affirmed
in whole.
B.

The Merger clause in the affirmed Ernest Money Agreement has the legal
effect of negating essential elements of a fraud claim, thereby precluding
recovery under tort (including fraud) theories.5

Essential elements of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim include a representation

5

This is only the case here because of two key facts: 1) the underlying
contract was affirmed, and 2) the underlying contract contained a merger clause. Where
plaintiffs seek rescission of the contract, merger or integration clauses have no practical
effect. See, e.g., DiFilippo v. Hidden Ponds Associates. 146 A.D.2d 737, 738, 537
N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (N.Y.A.D. 1989) ("It is well settled that a general merger clause is
ineffective to exclude parol evidence of fraud in the inducement in an action to rescind
the contract"); Norton v. Poplos, 443 A.2d 1, 7 (Del. Supr. 1982) ("[I]f a sales contract
contains a merger clause, a buyer may rescind the contract if it resulted from an innocent
but material misrepresentation by a seller"); Wilkinson v. Carpenter. 276 Or. 311, 554
P.2d 512, 519 (Or. 1976) ("The contract containing such a provision [a merger provision]
is voidable and itself subject to rescission"); Barnes v. Gould. 83 A.D.2d 900, 902, 442
N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (N.Y.A.D. 1981) ("The presence of a general merger clause does not
bar parol evidence of fraudulent representations in an action to rescind a contract").
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and reliance upon that representation. Id, at 1246. Because of the merger clause contained
in the Ernest Money Agreement, both the introduction of prior representations, as well as
reliance thereon are effectively b aired. See,, e^g,, Marowitz v. Wieland, 532 S.E.2d 705 (Ga.
App. March 27, 2000). That is precisely the situation in Marowitz v. Wieland, Id

There

a purchaser affirmed a contract which he had been induced to enter by what he claimed was
fraud. The court there concluded that "where a purchaser affirms a contract which contains
a merger or disclaimer provision and retains the purchased item, he is estopped from
asserting that he relied upon the seller's misrepresentation, and his action for fraud must fail."
The court further concluded that ff[t]he presence of a merger clause is determinative if the
defrauded party has not rescinded but has elected to affirm the contract." Id at 708.
In Crown Pontiac-GMC v. McCarrelL 695 So.2d 615,618 (Ala. 1997), the Alabama
Supreme Court concluded with regard to an affirmed fraudulently induced contract that
,f

[m]erger clauses are enforceable under state contract law." In yet another case, Nelson v.

Ehvay, 908 P.2d 102, 107 (Colo. 1995), the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that "the
merger clauses preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence to ascertain the intent of the
parties." There the court further provided that:

A

Integration clauses generally allow contracting parties to limit future
contractual disputes to issues relating to the express provisions of the contract.
Therefore, the terms of a contract intended to represent a final and complete
integration of the agreement between the parties are enforceable, and extrinsic
evidence offered to prove the existence of prior agreements is inadmissible.
The rationale for such a requirement was recently articulated in Paden v. Murray, 240
Ga. App. 487,489, 523 S.E.2d 75, 68 (1999):
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Where a party who is entitled to rescind a contract on ground of fraud or false
representations, and who has full knowledge of the material circumstances of
the case, freely and advisedly does anything which amounts to a recognition
of the transaction, or acts in a manner inconsistent with a repudiation of the
contract, such conduct amounts to acquiescence, and, though originally
impeachable, the contract becomes unimpeachable in equity.
(Emphasis added).
Therefore, "[depending upon which of the two actions is ultimately pursued, the
presence of a merger clause in the underlying contract may be determinative as to the
successful outcome. If the defraudedparty has not rescinded but has elected to affirm the
contract, he is relegated to a recovery in contract, and the merger clause will prevent his
recovery. If, on the other hand, he does rescind the contract, the merger clause will not
prevent his recovery under a tort theory." Cotton v. Bank South. 231 Ga. App. 812, 813-814,
499 S.E.2d 129 (1998) (Emphasis added).
The application of this rule of contract law was further discussed in Pennington v.
Braxlev. 224 Ga. App.344, 346-47, 480 S.E.2d 357,361 (1997), where a contract was
induced by fraud, thereby making it voidable, but was nonetheless affirmed by the party so
induced: The court reasoned:
If the purchaser affirms the sales contract, he is bound by the contract's terms
and is subject to any defenses which may be based on the contract. In the event
the contract contains an entire agreement clause [merger clause], that clause
operates as a disclaimer, establishing that the written contract completely and
comprehensively represents all the parties' agreement. This clause then bars
the purchaser from asserting reliance on the alleged misrepresentation not
contained within the contract. Therefore, any fraud claim the purchaser
might assert would be barred because reliance is an element essential to
establishing fraud. . . . By contrast, entire agreement clauses generally
concern contractual liability, and provide that all oral representations have
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merged into the written contract. While an entire agreement provision may, in
some instances, result in a waiver of claims, the parties to the contract have
ultimate control over its impact by reducing all the vital terms of their contract
to writing. Also, a party signing a contract containing an entire agreement
clause is not absolutely bound by it. If that party later learns of a fraud that
induced the contract but is not reflected in the contract fs terms, the party has
the choice of rescinding the contract and suing on thefraud or affirming the
contract and being bound by its terms. The entire agreement clause will bar
the fraud claim only in the latter instance.
(Emphasis added). "This result obtains because where the allegedly defrauded party affirms
a contract which contains a merger or disclaimer provision and retains the benefits, he is
estopped from asserting that he relied upon the other party's misrepresentation and his action
for fraud must fail." Estate of Sam Farkas, Inc. v. Clark, 517 S.E.2d 826, 829 (Ga. App.
1999); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E. 2d 597, 599 (N.Y. 1959) (Court denied
plaintiffs cause of action for fraud in the inducement over a sales contract that contained a
merger clause noting that to do otherwise "businesspeople would be unable to draft a contract
free from any reliance on representations").6
6

Diversified has argued that Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980), stands for
the proposition that when a party chooses to affirm a contract that was entered into based
on fraudulent misrepresentations, they can sue for damages that were not part of the
contract. The Dugan opinion simply does not support that argument. In the Dugan case,
a buyer purchased 22 and 3/4 acres. The property was described as including 12 acres of
native pasture and 8 acres of irrigated improved pasture. The written sale agreement
specifically noted that the property being sold included 22 and 3/4 acres. After the
closing, the buyer discovered that only 6.9 acres were actually conveyed or for sale
stopped paying the seller. Seller thereafter commenced a foreclosure action over the
property. The buyers countersued for damages based squarely on the contractual
misrepresentation over the acreage.
The Utah Supreme Court held that the buyer could seek damages that would
include the diminution in the value of the property actually bought (Supreme Court
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The position that the appealing parties take in this matter is not that a merger clause
prevents tort damages in all cases, such as when a aggrieved party rescinds a fraudulently
induced agreement. However, when the party affirms that agreement he also affirms the
merger clause and the fraud claim at that time losses its significance and no tort remedy
exists. Only contract remedies exist after a contract is affirmed.
In this case, when the contract was affirmed by Diversified the essential elements of
a misrepresentation and reliance thereon were subsumed by the merger clause. Therefore,
Diversified's claim for fraudulent misrepresentation are barred by that merger clause
contained in the Ernest Money Agreement. Consequently, the fraud claim must fail as a
matter of law. For Diversified to have retained the fraud claims it would have had to have
rescinded the transaction. Diversified did not rescind the tr ansaction with full knowledge
of the inducement that it considered fraudulent.

POINT 2:

IF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE IN THIS MATTER,
THE AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS EXCESSIVE AND IS IN
VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSES OF THE UNITED

ordered the trial court to use the "benefit of the bargain rule" id. at 1247), consequential
damages as a result of not getting what was represented to be sold (id. at 1250), and
punitive damages if these contractual misrepresentations were proven to be fraudulent (id.
at 1246). However, all of the damages allowed by the Supreme Court were those that
were squarely found in the contract that the buyers affirmed.
Accordingly, the Dugan v. Jones stands for the legal proposition that a party who
affirms a contract may thereafter sue for damages for misrepresentations contained in the
contract so affirmed. It does not stand for the proposition that a party who affirms a
contract can thereafter sue for misrepresentations that never became part of the final
contract that was affirmed.
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STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS; THE PUNITIVE AWARDS
SHOULD BE FURTHER REMITTED.
The award of punitive damages under the circumstances of this case is improper, as
a matter of law inasmuch as Diversified affirmed the contract and thereby is precluded from
any claim for fraud damages, thereby also precluding any claim for punitive damages.
Punitive damages are not to be awarded in a fraud action7 where the person defrauded
chooses not to rescind the contract but rather to enforce the contract. Nevertheless, if
7

The Utah Supreme Court has established the nine elements of a fraud
action. In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange. 817 P. 2d 789, 800 (Utah 1991), the Court
wrote:
We have previously restated the elements of fraud as follows:
(1) That a representation was made;
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact;
(3) which was false;
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly,
knowing that he [or she] had insufficient knowledge upon which to base
such representation;
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it;
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity;
(7) did in fact rely upon it;
(8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his [or her] injury and damage.
Pace v. Parrish. 122 Utah 141. 144-45. 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952); see
also Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty. 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982);
Kohler v. Garden City. 639 P.2d 162, 166 (Utah 1981); Wright v. Westside
Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah Ct.App.1990). See generally 37
Am.Jur.2d Fraud and Deceit §§ 432-436 (1968). We also stated in Pace that
the elements of fraud must be proven by "clear and convincing evidence."
Pace, 122 Utah at 143, 247 P.2d at 274.
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punitive damages are capable of being awarded in this matter, they are excessive and not in
proportion to the wrong committed.

The Due Process Clause of the United States

Constitution and the constitutional and case law of the State of Utah all indicate that the
award of punitive damages in this matter, even as already remitted by the trial court, is
excessive. As such, at the very least an additional substantial remittitur should be granted
by this Court.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate to the Court that the judgment rendered
in favor of Diversified and against the appellants, if sustainable at all, should be further
remitted inasmuch as the judgment even as remitted by the trial court continues to evidence
passion and prejudice in the award of punitive damages by the very size of the award.
A.

United States Constitution Analysis.

The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution "prohibits a State from
imposing a 'grossly excessive1 punishment on a tortfeasor." BMW of North America, Inc.
vXiore,517U.S.559,562,116 S.Ct. 1589,134 L.Ed. 2d 809 (1996). BMW marks the first
time that the United States Supreme Court found a punitive damages award so excessive that
it violated a party's substantive due process rights. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 585-86,116 S.Ct.
1589. Under BMW, even if an assessment of punitive damages is not deemed excessive
under governing state law, it may violate a party's substantive due process right to protection
from "grossly excessive" punitive damages awards. See BMW. 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct.
1589; see also Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415. 430 n. 12, 116 S.Ct.
2211 (1996)(noting that BMW provides "an ultimate federal constitutional check for
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exorbitancy" of punitive damages). Similarly, "like criminal punishment, punitive damages
require appropriate substantive and procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of unjust
punishment." Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Malone. 972 S.W. 2d 35,45 (Tex. 1996);
see also Transportation Inc. v. Moriel. 879 S.W.2d 10. 16-17 (Tex. 19941
BMW establishes three "guideposts" for determining whether a punitive damages
award is unconstitutionally excessive:
(1)

the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct;

(2)

the disparity between actual and punitive damages; and

(3)

a comparison of the punitive damages awarded and other civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for similar misconduct.

See BMW. 517 U.S. at 574-75, 116 S.Ct. 1589; see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp.. 509 U.S. 443,462,113 S.Ct. 2711,125 L.Ed.2d 366 (1993); Pacific MidLife Ins. Co. v. Haslip. 499 U.S. 1.20- 21. I l l S.Ct. 1032. 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).
1,

Degree of Reprehensibility.

The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct should be considered. See
BMW. 517 U.S. at 575,116 S.Ct. 1589. Conduct that endangers a person's health or safety
merits more punishment than purely economic harm. BMW. 517 U.S. at 576,116 S.Ct. 1589;
see also Continental Trend Resources. Inc. v. OXY USA. Inc.. 101 F.3d 634, 639 (10th
Cir.l996)("The appropriate penalty is no doubt below what would be justified if OXY's
conduct caused loss of life, widespread health hazards, or major environmental injury.").
2.

Ratio of compensatory to punitive damages.
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The ratio of compensatory to punitive damages is also significant. See BMW, 517
U.S. at 575.116 S.Ct. 1589: see also Alamo Nat. Bank v. Kraus. 616 S.W.2d 908,910 (Tex..
1981)("Exemplary damages must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages.ff). This is
the "second and perhaps most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive
punitive damages award...." BMW. 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589.8
3.

Other Civil or Criminal Penalties.

A comparison of the punitive damage award with other civil or criminal penalties that
could be imposed for comparable misconduct also provides a "indicium of excessiveness."
BMW, 517 U.S. at 583, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
B,

Utah Law Analysis,

The Utah Supreme Court has articulated the Utah position regarding the granting of
punitive damages. Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
Inasmuch as the opinion of the Utah Supreme Court was rendered in a fraud case and is so
throughly stated, we will provide the Court with extensive quotes from the opinion. A chart
depicting in a one page format all of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals
Court opinions since 1982 on remittitur of punitive damages for excessiveness is attached
hereto as Appendix E.
1.

Factors for Assessing Amount of Punitive Damages: Punitive damages

8

In BMW, the punitive damage award (even after reduction by the Alabama
Supreme Court) was 500 times the amount of the actual damage award. See BMW, 517
U.S. at 582, 116 S.Ct. 1589.
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must have some relationship to the facts and the amount of actual
damages.
Under Utah law, certain factors are to be considered in assessing the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded. Those include the following seven:
(i)

the relative wealth of the defendant

(ii)

the nature of the alleged misconduct

(iii)

the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct

(iv)

the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others

(v)

the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct

(vi)

the relationship of the parties

(vii)

the amount of actual damages awarded.

See Crookston at 808; Bundv v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von
Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). The cases have done little more than list
these factors. Id.
This Court, in Crookston. supra, spent its efforts to provide guidance to element (vii)
regarding the comparison of the punitive damages to the amount of actual damages. While
that comparison does not place a cap on the award of punitive damages it does provide
substantial guidance as to the maximum amount that a jury could award when punitive
damages are sought. It certainly sets a soft cap on the amount. The Utah Supreme Court
without equivocation established some "concretely definable" parameters within which the
jury could operate. Those parameters do not allow the award of punitive damages as
compared to actual damages to exceed a ratio of 3 to 1, except in the most unusual and
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egregious of cases. This analysis is made with the overlay that "punitives are allowed only
where there is " 'wilful and malicious' conduct,... or... conduct which manifests a knowing
and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the rights of others." Crookston at 807;
Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp.. Inc.. 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted);
see also Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 304, 117 P. 54, 57 (1911). Consequently, since
punitive damages can only be awarded in circumstances where "wilful and malicious"
conduct or "reckless indifference" to others occurs, if the award is to be enhanced beyond
the ratios set for the determining the reasonableness of awards of punitive damages the
conduct has to be significantly more egregious than "wilful and malicious" or "reckless
indifference." Perhaps the placing of another life or physical safety in extreme jeopardy
would be the most likely factor for enhancing the amount of punitive damages beyond the
recognized ratios. Mere economic loss would not enhance the amount of punitive damages
beyond ordinary standards.
2.

Application of Punitive Damages to Actual Damages Ratios:
damages that are excessive will not be upheld.

Punitive

Since this Court focused its attention to an extensive discussion of the appropriate
ratios of actual damages to punitive damages, we will do the same.
(a)

Importance of Ratios:

With Regard to the importance of the punitive

damages being in reasonable relation to the actual damages the Court said:
Among the seven factors we have repeatedly listed that should be considered
in determining the amount of a punitive damage award is the "amount of
actual damages." E.g., Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759. Although we have not
articulated any standard for determining the importance to be assigned this
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factor, we have said that the amount of a punitive damage award generally
must bear a "reasonable and rational" relationship to the actual damages. Id.
The punitive damage awards we have characterized as violating this
"reasonable and rational" relationship rule have been labeled "grossly
disproportionate" to the actual damages awarded and have been said to be the
result of passion or prejudice. These awards have been either reduced by this
court directly or remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. See, e.g.,
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center. Inc., 702 P.2d 98. 101 (Utah 1985).
Id at 810.
(b)

Overriding Importance of a Proper Ratio:

With regard to the overriding

importance of the ratio of actual damages to punitive damages the Court said.
Although this is only one of the factors identified by this court to date to be
considered in determining an appropriate amount of damages, it is one which
is more concretely definable and which we today further refine to give better
guidance. We leave for another day the possibility of further refining other
factors we have previously identified, as well as the possibility that additional
factors may be developed as we consider particular situations presented to us
in the course of reviewing trial court rulings.
Id fh.25.
(c)

When Punitive Damages are Less than $100,000.00:

On

the

establishment of a proper ratio, the Court concluded in cases where the punitive damages are
less than $100,000.00 the punitive damages should not exceed three times the actual
damages. Where punitive damages exceed three times the actual damages (i.e. 4 to 1, 5 to
1, etc.) the award is presumptively excessive as being the product of bias and prejudice. The
Court wrote:
Although vague in its articulation, an examination of the results of our cases
shows that in its operation, this "reasonable and rational" relationship principle
has produced some fairly predictable results. Generally, we have found
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punitive damage awards below $100,000 not to be excessive only when the
punitives do not exceed actual damages by more than a ratio of approximately
3 to l.9 See, e.g.. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Branch v.
Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust 618
P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Tavlor. 14 Utah 2d 152,379 P.2d 380 (1963);
DeVas v.Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133,369 P,2d 290 (1962): Evans v. Gaisford 122
Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952).
(d)

When Punitive Damages are Greater than $100.000.00:

On

the

establishment of a proper ratio, this Court concluded in cases where the punitive damages
are greater than $ 100,000.00 the punitive damages should be less than three times the actual
damages, more like two times or even less. In that situation when the ratio is 3 to 1 or more
disparate (i.e. 4 to 1, 5 to 1 etc.) the award is presumptively excessive as being the product
of bias and prejudice. VanDvke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors, Inc., 758 P.2d 962,
965 (Utah App. 1988). The ratio should be more like 2 to 1 or 1 to 1 or perhaps even greater
(i.e. 3/t to 1 or 14 to 1). The Court wrote:
Because of the limited number of cases considering large awards, it is more
difficult to note a particular pattern once the award exceeds approximately
$100,000. However, it is safe to say that these large awards appear to receive
more scrutiny than the smaller awards and that the acceptable ratio appears
lower. See, e.g., Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 772 (Stewart, J., concurring and
dissenting) (majority opinion upholding $500,000 punitives-1 to 1 ratio);
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985)
(Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting)(majority upholding $200,000
punitives— lA to 1 ratio). In one such case, when the ratio exceeded 2 to 1, we
reduced the award on grounds of excessiveness. See First Security Bank, 653

9

In Footnote 26, the Court wrote: "A few cases have upheld punitives above
a 3 to 1 ratio. See Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959) (upholding
punitives of $860 to actual damages of $140); see also Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258,
270, 269 P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing punitives to $1,500 where actuals were
$362.50)." Crookstonat810.
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P.2d at 598-99 (reducing $100,000 punitives -3 to 1 ratio-to $50,000-2 to 1
ratio).
Id at 810.
While the number of Utah cases examining awards exceeding $100,000 is more
limited it is safe to say that the larger the award the more scrutiny the court places on it and
the acceptable ratios tend to be smaller. See Von Hake v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766,772 (Utah
1985) (upholding $ 500,000 punitive damages: 1 to 1 ratio); Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106,1113 (Utah 1985)(upholding$ 200,000 punitive damages: 1/2
to 1 ratio). In First Security Bank the court reduced a ratio of more than 2 to 1 on the
grounds of excessiveness. See First Security Bank v. J.B.J. Feedvards, 653 P.2d 591,598-99
(Utah 1982) (reducing $100,000 punitive damages: 3 to 1 ratio, to $ 50,000: 2 to 1 ratio).
(e)

Out of Parameter Awards are not Upheld:

The Court then went on to

state a general rule and indicate that punitive damages that do not fall within the perimeters
that the court has set "have seldom been upheld." The Court wrote:
The general rule to be drawn from our past cases appears to be that where the
punitives are well below $100,000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1
ratio to actual damages have seldom been upheld and that where the award is
in excess of $ 100,000, we have indicated some inclination to overturn awards
having ratios of less than 3 to 1.
Id. at 810.
(f)

Justification of Excessive Awards:

If the ratio is to be more disparate

than 3 to 1 for the $100,000.00 or lesser award or even less disparate than that for the
$ 100,000.00 or greater award, even though the case was tried to a jury, the court must justify
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such an out-of-character award. The Court wrote:
The judge's articulation should generally be couched in terms of one or more
of the seven factors we earlier listed as proper considerations in determining
the amount of punitive damages, unless some other factor seems compelling
to the trial court. For example, a trial court might conclude that an award
should stand, despite a ratio that is higher than we have generally approved,
because the defendant displayed an extremely high degree of malice, e.g.,
actual intent to harm10 or a high degree of likelihood of great harm based on
the reprehensible nature of the act.11
* * *

In sum, the trial judge's articulation should explain why the award is not
excessive despite the fact that it exceeds the general pattern of awards upheld
in our prior cases.
Id. at 811-812.
It is interesting that the cases which this Court refers to for facts to support an award
that is not within acceptable parameters point to the risk of physical harm or when economic
gain is associated with personal injury. See, e.g.. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.
App.3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 388 (1981) (upholding punitive award of $3.5 million for
"conscious and callous disregard of public safety in order to maximize corporate profits");
Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So.2d 1050, 1050 (Fla.Ct.App.l977)(upholding award of

10

See, e.g.. Cox v. Stolworthv, 496 P.2d 682, 690 (Idaho 1972) (exemplary
damages in deceptive for-profit business scheme should make the cost of such repetitive
antisocial conduct uneconomical), overruled in part, Cheney v. Palos Verdees Inv. Corp.,
104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661, 667 (1983). [Footnote the Court's.]
11

See, e.g.. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr.
348, 388 (1981) (upholding punitive award of $3.5 million for "conscious and callous
disregard of public safety in order to maximize corporate profits"); Ford Motor Co. v.
Havlick, 351 So.2d 1050, 1050 (Fla.Ct.App.l977)(upholding award of $1,740,000 against
Ford). [Footnote the Court's.]
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$1,740,000 against Ford). It is interesting to note that even in these cases the awards of
punitive damages ($3.5 million and $ 1.74 million) against Ford Motor Company, one of the
country's largest business entities is roughly equal to the punitive damages awarded against
the defendants in this case where there was no risk of physical harm and the defendants were
small and not in any way in the economic class of Ford Motor Company. That in itself
shows the bias and prejudice that was shown towards these defendants.
• 3.

Evidence of Passion or Prejudice:
Prejudice may be inferred from
the amount of the judgment and no other evidence is necessary or
required.

Diversified claims that the trial court erred by granting a new trial, or in the
alternative, a remittitur because (a) there was no evidence that the jury acted on improper
passion or prejudice; or (b) based solely on the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory
damages. However, it is clear that the verdict was excessive and passion or prejudice will be
assumed in such a case.
Following a jury verdict, and a motion for new trial, the trial judge may find that the
verdict was a result of passion or prejudice because of its excessiveness. While generally the
judge has no insight into the jury deliberations the judge must interpret the verdict and weigh
it according to the facts and the law. In this case, the jury returned a verdict with an award
where the punitive damages awarded by the jury were grossly disproportionate to the award
of actual damages and way out of line to those awards that have been accepted by the Utah
Supreme Court. Diversified argues that there was no evidence before the trial court that the
verdict was a result of passion or prejudice. However, in First Security Bank v. J.B.J.
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Feedvards. 653 P.2d 591, 599 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme Court stated that:
[WJhere it appears that such an award resulted from passion or prejudice
rather than reason and justice, this Court must not permit it to stand. In the
absence of evidence in the trial record evincing such passion or prejudice,
such may be shown by the excessive amount of the punitive damages award
itself.
(emphasis added); see also Bundv v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 758-759 (Utah
1984); Van Dyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distr.. Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 965 (Utah Ct. App.
1988).12 Clearly the excessiveness of the verdict is prima facie evidence that there was
passion or prejudice involved. It follows then, that if the ratio of punitive to actual damages
is outside the generally accepted range, the court may assume that the award is excessive.
This assumption is accompanied by the presumption that the award is due to passion or
prejudice.
C»

Application to This Case:
Applying the foregoing factors to this
case justifies and compels a further remittitur to a level that falls within
acceptable ratios.

In this case, the original verdict awarded by the jury far exceeded the realm that the
United States Supreme Court and this Utah Supreme Court have found acceptable. In fact

12

In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789, 811 (Utah 1991), the Court stated:
[W]e find that guidelines emerge for trial courts faced with challenges to
punitive damage awards on the grounds of excessiveness under rule 59(a)(5).
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages falls within the range that this
court has consistently upheld, then the trial court may assume that the
award is not excessive.
(emphasis added). If the ration is outside the range then we can assume that it is excessive.
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the punitive damages determined by the jury were nearly seventy times the actual damages
and can be clearly presumed to be excessive and the result of passion and prejudice. The
trial court remitted the punitive damages but still left the amount of punitive damages far in
excess of acceptable amounts. The trial court remitted a ratio of $5,130,500.00 punitive
damages to $71,336.00 actual damages (69.8 to 1) to a judgment of $1,052,757.00 in
punitive damages to $71,336.00 actual damages (14.75 to 1). Even in its remitted amount
the damages are excessive.13 That ratio still exceeds the "rule of thumb" ratio and cannot be
justified.
The trial court failed to adequately remit the amount of the judgment based upon two
flawed premises. First, the trial court treated a joint a several judgment of $71,336.00 as if
it was a separate judgment against each defendant. In doing so the trial court applied a ratio
of punitive damages to actual damages for each defendant when there was in actuality only
one $71,336.00 loss attributed to fraud. Punitive damages ought to have been aggregated to
compare to the actual damage. Second, the trial court supported the punitive damage ratios
by including the negligence damages, thereby reducing the multiple of punitive damages to
actual damages. And, third, the trial court was unduly harsh given the facts of the matter.
1.

In Determining Ratios the Punitive Damages Should Be Aggregated.

In determining the ratio the aggregation of the punitive damages awarded is the only
rational method of creating a true picture of the comparison of the actual damages to the

13

The trial court by reducing the amount of punitive damages did the right
thing but just did not do enough of the right thing.
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punitive damages.

The cases universally demand an examination of the ratio of

compensatory to punitive damages. While four defendants were found to be liable for some
form of fraud, they were determined to be joint and several judgment debtors for only the
amount of $71,336.00. As such, the actual compensatory damage for the fraud was
$71,336.00, not four times $71,336.00. Diversified would not be able to collect four times
the actual damages for those actual damages. Therefore, it stands to reason that the amount
of punitive damages awarded should not be justified by the whole amount of lass attributed
to each defendant. If it were otherwise, there would be a premium on joining as many people
as possible as defendants so that the punitive damages could be leveraged to higher and
higher amounts. The trial court's remitted judgment awarding $1,052,757.00 in punitive
damages, therefore, is an award that is wholly and unquestionably out of proportion to the
actual loss that was sustained for the fraud committed as this Court has set guidelines for
awarding such damages. The question that this Court is asked to decide is: How much in
punitive damages can a loss of $71,336.00 support. The remitted amount of $1,052,757.00
is far beyond that amount. The amount should be more like two times14 the amount of actual
damage, or $142,672.00 (or perhaps even less) allocated amongst the defendants.
The fact that other civil or criminal penalties exist for claimed violations shed some
light on how significant the wrongful conduct was. It is interesting that in this case the jury

14

See discussion on the punitive damages to actual damages ratio supra.
When punitive damages are in excess of $100,000.00 the ratio should be less than three
times and more like two times or less than the amount of actual damages.
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was asked to determine what the civil penalties would be for the actions of the parties. Those
determinations are as follows:

EFENDANT

AMOUNT OF PENALTY

Knapp

$60,946.00

University

$-0-

Turner

$41,502.00

Haws

$4,200.00

TOTAL:

$106,648.00

The statute under which these penalties are rendered is Utah Code Ann. §61-2-11. That
statute provides a long list of violations for which a "civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
$500 per violation" may be imposed. Given those damages there would have had to be
found at the very least 213 violations. Yet their clearly was no evidence of that many
violations. The significance is, however, that the legislature has determined the value of the
violations that the plaintiffs claimed to have been damaged by. That is not to exceed $500
per violation. That again is grossly out of proportion to the $1,052,757.00 in punitive
damages and further demonstrates to excessive nature of the punitive damage findings made
by the jury, even as remitted by the trial court.
2

Punitive Damages Should Not be Supported by Negligence Damages.

The trial court supported his determination of punitive damages to actual damages
ratios by combining both fraud and negligence damages together thereby skewing the ratios
improperly . Simple negligence will never suffice as a basis upon which punitive damages
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may be awarded. "Punitive damages are not awarded for mere inadvertence, mistake, errors
of judgment and the like, which constitute ordinary negligence." Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 908 comment b at 465 (1979). A defendant's conduct must be malicious or in
reckless disregard for the rights of others, although actual intent to cause injury is not
necessary. Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267,277-78 (Utah 1982). By using
negligence damages to bolster a ratio of actual damages is a not to subtle way to award
punitive damages for negligent conduct and is improper.
3.

The Facts Do Not Warrant Greater Than "Standard" Punitive Damages.

To get punitive damages in the first place a party must have already acted with malice,
spite or intent to injure. Therefore, the "standard" punitive damages will suffice under all but
the most egregious circumstances. What follows here are some factors that place this matter
directly in the "standard" category, thereby compelling the imposition of punitive damages
if they are going to be assessed at all in that "standard" category and not as an exception to
that category.
The harm inflicted was solely economic in nature. See BMW of North America, Inc.
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). There was no
physical harm inflicted. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 116
S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). The harm inflicted was not in any way in reckless
disregard of the health or safety of the plaintiffs. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 562, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996). Diversified received real
property and improvements in value in excess of $600,000.00 (more likely in excess of
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$700,000.00 given that was the price the property was actually sold by First Security Bank
and the property had been appraised at a fair market value of $900,000.00 or more.). There
was no evidence that the damage to the plaintiff exposed the plaintiffs to ruinous bankruptcy
or other severe financial distress. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937,
940 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II).
There was no evidence that Diversified failed to have any benefit from the transaction
or that there was no benefit to the transaction. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II). The fraud damages in relation to the value
of the property was no more than 10% of the value of the property. There is no evidence that
the plaintiffs' mental or financial health were devastated. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II); Terry v. Z.C.M.I., 605 P.2d 314,
328-29 (Utah 1979)(false arrest caused debilitating depression). [Parish testified that the
harm which resulted from the impropriety was a dampening of his enthusiasm and a
reduction of the return on the investment. (T.T. at 87)] Payment of the fraud damages and
interest will make the plaintiffs whole financially.
There is no evidence that any of the defendants had previously engaged in the conduct
that was found to be objectionable by the jury. (R.) See Crookston v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II). The conduct that was found to be
objectionable by the jury was an isolated event.

(R.) See Crookston v. Fire Insurance

Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II). There is no evidence that the
conduct found to be objectionable by the jury was a part of a pattern of wrongdoing. See
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Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 860 P.2d 937, 941 (Utah 1993)(Crookston II). The
transaction was a purely business transaction between sophisticated and experienced business
people.
The transaction was sufficiency favorable so that Diversified desired to retain the
benefits of the transaction and not rescind the transaction. The property ultimately sold at
an increased value over which it was purchased. Diversified completed the transaction even
thought they had some reservations about the conduct of the defendants at the time of
closing. Given the choice to rescind or affirm the contract diversified sought to affirm the
contract.
Richard Knapp was relatively youthful at the time of the conduct, being only 26 years
old.(R. at 2084). There was no evidence that Richard Knapp had done the conduct that he
was accused of doing prior to this incident or after the incident.(R). Richard Knapp was not
an active real estate agent and in fact had done only one (1) real estate transaction as an
agent prior to that time and none after that time.(T.T. at 331). Richard Knapp had a less
active role and passive role in the transaction than did Gilbert Turner.(R. at 2092). Parish
testified that Knapp never made a misrepresentation regarding the transaction.(T.T. at 167).
Richard Knapp surrendered his real estate licence to the licencing agency and has not
received or applied for a reinstatement of his licence. Therefore, Richard Knapp cannot be
in a position to perpetrate the same conduct in the future. Richard Knapp was terminated by
Haws over the conduct that resulted in the punitive damage award. (T.T. at 249).
Richard Knapp sought to rescind the transaction when there was concern that the
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plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the transaction.(T.T. at 11). Richard Knapp is not a interstate
chain of businesses where the transaction sought to be sanctioned is a common or
reoccurring event. See Hall v. Wall-Mart Stores. Inc.. 959 P. 2d 109, 112 (Utah 1998).
With regard to defendant University specifically, University participated in the
wrongful conduct only through Richard Knapp.(R. at 2079). University sole participation
was to own the property prior to the sale to the Diversified.Qd.) There was no evidence of
University's wealth. (Id.)
With regard to defendant Haws Companies specifically, Haws Companies terminated
Richard Knapp over the conduct that resulted in the punitive damage award.(T.T. at 249).
Haws Companies terminated Gilbert Turner before this conduct that resulted in the punitive
damage award became known to Haws Companies when other unrelated improprieties that
were unrelated to Haws Companies came to light.(T.T. at 202). The jury verdict against
Haws for punitive damages is roughly 25% of its net worth.(R. at 2076). Haws Companies
never received any remuneration for the sale transaction between Diversified and University.
With regard to defendant Gilbert Turner specifically, Gilbert Turner surrendered his
real estate licence to the licencing agency and has not received or applied for a reinstatement
of his licence.(R. at 2090). Therefore, Gilbert Turner cannot be in a position to perpetrate
the same conduct in the fiiture.(Id.) No evidence of Gilbert Turner's wealth was submitted
to the jury.(R. at 2093). See Hall v. Wall-Mart Stores, Inc.. 959 P. 2d 109, 112 (Utah
1998)(ff[A] plaintiff who fails to introduce evidence of the defendant's wealth risks having
an award struck down on the basis of excessiveness."
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

44

Based upon the foregoing, the punitive damage award, if any award is granted, ought
to be remitted to an amount that falls well within the guidelines established by this Court for
the award of punitive damages. That should be no more than two times the actual damages,
and actual damages should use only those damages that can support a punitive award in the
first place — the fraud damages and not the negligence damages.
POINT 3:

IF PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE APPROPRIATE IN THIS MATTER,
THE AWARD AGAINST KNAP? AND HIS EMPLOYER, UNIVERSITY
PROPERTIES, INC, FOR THE ACTIONS OF KNAPP CONSTITUTE
A DOUBLE RECOVERY AND ARE EXCESSIVE.

As has been discussed previously in this matter, the award of punitive damages under
the circumstances of this case is improper, as a matter of law. Punitive damages are not to
be awarded in a fraud action where the person defrauded chooses not to rescind the contract
but rather to enforce the contract. Nevertheless, if punitive damages are capable of being
awarded in this matter, an entity and its agent should not be liable for separate awards of
punitive damages for actions of the agent. In this matter, the remitted judgment allocated
punitive damages to Knapp in the amount of $500,000.00 and to his employer and wholly
owned corporation, University, in the amount of $214,000.00. University's role in the
transaction was acted out exclusively by Knapp.
If a Judgment is to be rendered against Knapp and University it should be in the
amount rendered against Knapp not in separate amounts against each.
In this matter the jury returned a verdict awarding punitive damages against Knapp
and University for the actions of Knapp. The evidence at trial established that Knapp was
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president of University Properties and that he was the 90% owner of University. (R. at
2079) "[T]here was no testimony or evidence of any corporate act of University Properties
taken by any other person other than Mr. Knapp." (Id. Quoting Judge Taylor in his
Memorandum Ruling whereby a remittitur was granted.) University was completely
dominated and controlled by Knapp. (Id.) In fact, the conduct of Knapp could not be
separated from the actions of University. (Id.) No additional evidence beyond such mere
ratification has been established.
The general rule is, absent unusual circumstances, the principle is not liable for the
intentional torts of its agent, and especially not liable for punitive damages for the actions
of its agents. While in this case the principle may be liable for the acts of its agent, that
liability is still derivative. "[Liability, if any, of a principal or master to a third person is
purely derivative and dependant entirely upon the principle of respondeat superior," and the
"plaintiff can have but one satisfaction - payment of the damages caused by the wrongful
act of [the servant]". McLain v. Taco Bell Corp.. 2000 WL 343629 *9 (N.C. App.)(emphasis
added). While the plaintiff may sue the servant and/or the master/principle, "the recovery
against the principal. . . may not exceed the amount of the recovery against the . . .
servant." McLain v. Taco Bell Corp.. 2000 WL 343629, *9 (N.C. App.Yciting Watson v.
Dixon. 511 S.E.2d 37, 40-41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999))(emphasis added); see also Nelson v.
Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. 935 P.2d
512, 513 (Utah 1997)("although the employer and employee are not [common law]
tortfeasors, they are nonetheless each obligatedfor the same thing- total reparation of the
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damages to the victim")(emphasis added). A finding by a jury that an employer was only
"negligent in hiring, supervising and retaining the employee [ratification] would not warrant
an award of punitive damages." CP & B Enterprises, Inc. v. Mellert 2000 WL 236349 * 6
(Ala.).
Diversified is entitled to only one recovery from Knapp and University Properties as
a matter of law. Even if punitive damages are proper as against University Properties, the
general "one recovery" rule stated above applies with equal force to awards of punitive
damages. Punitive damages against an employer in an amount greater than against employee
are only proper where the employer's liability appears "based upon more than mere
ratification." Watson v. Dixon, 511 S.E.2d 37, 40-41 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). In this case,
nothing more than "mere ratification" has been established.
Accordingly, Diversified is entitled to only one recovery from Knapp (the employee)
and University Properties (the employer). Further, the evidence established at trial as set
forth by Diversified shows no actions by University Properties beyond mere ratification, and
accordingly punitive damages may not be awarded against University Properties, and, if
punitive damages are awarded against University Properties, the one recovery rule applies
in full force.
///'
///
•

/

/
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///
///
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POINT 4:

THE JURY WAS NOT ALLOWED TO SEE RELEVANT AND
MATERIAL EVIDENCE THAT COULD HAVE HAD AN IMPACT ON
THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES, IF ANY, THAT WOULD BE
AWARDED, INCLUDING THE AMOUNT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES,

Under Utah law, certain factors15 are to be considered in assessing the amount of
punitive damages to be awarded. See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789,
808 (Utah 1991); Bundv v. Century Equip. Co.. 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake
v. Thomas. 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). The jury is to consider the effect of the conduct
on the tflives of the plaintiff and others" as a factor in the award of punitive damages.
Punitive damages "should not be unreasonably disproportionate . . . to the nature of the
wrong done and the injury caused," Kesler v. Rogers. 542 P.2d 354,359 (Utah 1975), in that
an award of punitive damages should "bear some relation to the injury . . .." Falkenberg v.
Neff, 269 P. 1008,1013 (Utah 1928). One of the effects on the lives of Diversified was what
the transaction brought to Diversified. In Diversified contended that it was induced to enter
a transaction that ultimately paid it very handsomely. Yet the jury was never allowed to see
that. As such, the jury was left with a very incomplete picture of what the effect of the

15

Those factors include the following seven:
(i)
the relative wealth of the defendant
(ii)
the nature of the alleged misconduct
(iii) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct
(iv) the effect thereof on the lives of the plaintiff and others
(v)
the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct
(vi) the relationship of the parties
(vii) the amount of actual damages awarded.
See Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991); Bundv v.
Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,
771 (Utah 1985).
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transaction had on Diversified.
One of the best ways to determine the effect on Diversified is to determine the
ultimate return Diversified made on its investment.

In this case Diversified made

$415,000.00 in just under four years on a $785,000.00 investment when the property was
sold for $1,200,000.00. That is a hefty 13.2% return on its investment. There is no question
that Diversified made significant profit off the deal. Diversified never wanted to rescind the
deal, even though defendant Knapp offered to completely undo the transaction. Diversified
liked the bargain it got. Diversified specific decision to affirm the transaction is evidence
in and of itself that it knew it was a good deal. In the present case, it is undisputed that
Diversified decided to affirm the Ernest Money Agreement and retain the benefits of the
contract, e.g., the purchase of the Office Building.16
The trial court, however, denied the jury the ability to assess the consequence of the
transaction when it denied the jury the ability to see the ultimate financial impact on
Diversified for the actions. Furthermore, the fact that Diversified choose to not rescind the
transaction is probative of the value that Diversified placed on the transaction. In that regard
the market place has spoken volumes as to the quality of the transaction into which
Diversified entered. The impact could not have been so great on Diversified when, having
the opportunity to rescind the transaction from the earliest days, Diversified choose to stay

16

By retaining the benefit of the bargain under the Ernest Money Agreement,
Diversified effectively and irrevocably waived any claim of fraud in the inducement. See
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for new Trial.
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to reap the benefits.
The jury should have been allowed to have seen the evidence of the sale of the Office
Building and the rejection of the offer to rescind in order to more fully assess the impact on
Diversity. A reasonable juror could conclude that the negative impact on Diversified was
in fact minimal, if any.
POINT 5:

UTAH CODE ANN. §78-22-1 PROVIDES FOR THE RELEASE OF A
JUDGMENT LIEN WHEN THE JUDGMENT IS SECURED.

Supersedeas bonds were issued in this matter for the undertaking of the appeal. Those
bonds fully secured the payment of the judgment. Once secured, the Knapp defendants
requested that the court release the judgment lien so that Knapp could continue to undertake
his business. The trial court granted that request over the objections of Diversified.
Diversified appealed that decision to this Court. A motion was heard on the law and motion
calendar of this court whereby Diversified asked this court to stay the release of that
judgment lien. That motion was denied and the issue of whether a supersedeas bond can be
sufficient security to release a lien was referred for further briefing.
A.

Controlling Authority:

The applicable and controlling authority is Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(5), which
provides as follows:
(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit with the court where
the notice of appeal is filed of cash or other security in a form and amount
considered sufficient by the court that rendered the judgment to secure the
full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other
anticipated damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal, the
lien created by Subsection (2) shall be terminated as provided in Subsection
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(5)(b).
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection
(5)(a), the court shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the
judgment under Subsection (2) and granting the judgment creditor a perfected
lien in the deposited security as of the date of the original judgment.
(Emphasis added).
The Court requested that the legislative history of this section of the code be included
in the briefing.
In the 1999 General Session of the Utah State Legislature, Senator John Valentine
sponsored Senate Bill 142, entitled, "An Act Relating to the Judicial Code; Providing for the
termination ofjudgement liens which are appealed upon the filing of adequate security; and
making technical changes." The Bill was amended from the originally submitted Bill which
evolved into the subsection 5 which was added to the existing statute.
The legislative history surrounding Senate Bill 142 is minimal. In fact, the legislation
was largely unopposed and the Utah State Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel commented briefly on the bill stating that "[a] limited review of this legislation
raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns." Legislative Review Note 1-28-99
10:23 AM. Copies of the original Senate Bill with hand written revisions, the final version
and the Legislative Review Note are attached as Appendix F for the Court's convenience.
B.

The phrase "other security" in Utah Code Ann. §78-22-l(5)(a)-(b)
includes the use of a supersedeas bond to secure a judgment if the trial
court finds it to be "in a form and amount considered sufficient."

Diversified asks this Court to conclude that since the phrase "supersedeas bond" does not
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appear in the statute that a supersedeas bond cannot be used to secure a judgment so that the
judgment lien can be released. That would be a misplaced interpretation of that statute. The
statute provides that what may be used to secure a judgment is "cash or other security."
"[Statutory enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, a n d . . . interpretations are to be avoided which render some part of a provision
nonsensical or absurd." Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp.. 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980), see
also State v. Martinez 896 P.2d 38, 40 (UT App. 1995).
Furthermore, "not only by a consideration of the words themselves, but by
considering, as well, the context, the purposes of the law, and the circumstances under which
the words were employed" the meaning can be determined. People of Puerto Rico v. Shell
Co.. 58 S.Ct. 167, 169, 82 L.Ed. 235; cited by Chez ex rel. Weber College v. Utah State
Bldg. Commission. 74 P.2d 687. 690 (Utah 1937V
The purpose of the statute in question was to find acceptable ways to relieve a
judgment debtor of the lien upon his property during appeal when the underlying judgment
is adequately secured. Adequate security could be cash or "other security." What the Utah
Legislature did was leave to the courts the ability to determine what that "other security"
could be. Conceivably the "other security" could be any number of different items of
security17 that would have to be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine if it is

It does not take much imagination to come up with an extensive list of what could be
"other security." Real property, personal property, contract rights and other intangibles could
all be used to secure the judgment. It is left to the trial court to determine whether the
security, in whatever form, is sufficient.
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"sufficient." The responsibility to determine what the "other security" may be and whether
it is sufficient rests with the trial court. Given that the phrase "other security" should have
some meaning and that the purpose of the statute is to relieve a judgment debtor of a
judgment lien when the judgment creditor is protected, it is more than reasonable to conclude
that a supersedeas bond can be such "other security."
Diversified wants to suggest that the legislature had to include a supersedeas bond by
name in "other security." Quite the opposite is true. If the legislature had intended that a
supersedeas bond could not be that "other security" it should have said so. Since the
legislature did not so exclude a supersedeas bond as such security and supersedeas bonds do
in fact secure judgments, a supersedeas bond is one of many types of security that can be
relied upon to secure a judgment in order to allow the termination of the judgment lien.
In this case, the trial court concluded that supersedeas bonds in an amount equal to
or greater than the amount of the judgment against the Knapp defendants plus anticipated
interest which bonds are payable upon the resolution of the appeal in this matter were
sufficient security. There was no evidence presented to the trial court that the bonding
company, Travelers Casualty and Surety Company of America, was not solvent and capable
to meet the obligations of its bonds. Diversified has raised no issue, either in briefing or in
oral presentation before this Court18 or the trial court, as to the current capacity of the surety
18

The related issue of whether the Order Terminating Judgment Lien should be stayed
was argued to the Court on its Law and Motion calender on January 16,2001. At that time
Diversified made no claim that Travelers is not capable to meet its obligations under the
bonds, but asserted that Travelers might be incapable or unwilling in the future to meet its
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to perform its duties under the bonds.
G.

There is no Utah authority that would preclude the trial court using a
supersedeas bond to secure a judgment and terminate a judgment lien.

Diversified has cited below two Utah cases to the effect that the "sole purpose" of a
supersedeas bond is to stay enforcement. Those cases, Skeen v. Pratt. 87 Utah 121,48 P. 2d
457, 458 (Utah 1935), and U-M Investments v. Rav. 701 P. 2d 1061, 1063 (Utah 1985), on
review, are not on point in any manner. Skeen stands for the proposition that an appealed
but unbonded judgment can be nonetheless executed upon. U-M Investments stands for the
proposition that a supersedeas bond secures the entire judgment and not just the costs on
appeal. Neither case addressed a situation where a sufficient supersedeas bond was issued
and the request was made to terminate a judgment lien.
Those cases did not in any way determine or even remotely touch upon whether a
sufficient supersedeas bond is also sufficient to require the termination of the judgment lien.
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, both of those cases predate the Utah statute that
controls this issue. The relevant provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(5), were adopted
by the Utah Legislature in 1999, long after the cases referred to by Diversified were
concluded. Therefore, even if the conclusion of those cases were that the sole purpose of a
supersedeas bond is to preclude execution that conclusion would now have to be modified
in light of the legislative pronouncements in Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(5). If the cases cited

obligations that it has bound itself to before the Fourth District Court. Thus, Diversified's
claims rest fully on factually unsupported speculation.
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by Diversified were applicable they would have undoubtedly been countermanded by the
legislature in enacting the modifying provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-22-1(5). See
generally. In the interest of E.H.H.. 2000 UT App 368,1(16, 16 P. 3d 1257.
It is simply a stretch beyond recognition to say that the opinions cited by Diversified
are a "clear" indication of what this Court should determine in this matter today, as
Diversified suggests. Those cases do not purport to even address the issue before this Court
nor do they take into account all that the legislature has recently said on the subject.
The release of the judgment liens on property held by the Knapp defendants so that
the judgment debtors (the Knapp defendants) can continue with their respective businesses,
while the judgment creditor, Diversified, remains fully secured, should be sustained. The
entry of a sufficient supersedeas bond in this matter, as has already been determined by the
trial court, makes the judgment lien redundant and an improper restriction on the Knapp
defendants. Therefore, the trial court's determination to "enter an order terminating the lien
created by the judgment" should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis and authority, this Court should further modify the
judgment in this matter to reflect the law. Consequently, the finding of fraud damages and
the derivative punitive damages ought to be reversed inasmuch as Diversified affirmed the
contract containing an integration clause. If the Court does not reverse the finding of fraud
damages then this Court, at the least, should further remit the punitive damage award so that
those damages do not exceed two times the fraud damages only ($142,672.00) and allocate
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that amount amongst the defendants (or remand to the trial court to undertake the allocation)
in the same proportion that the trial court below allocated punitive damages. Further,
University and Knapp damages ought to be merged so that there is only one recovery for
punitive damages between those two in the amount that the punitives damages are awarded
to Richard Knapp. Attached as Appendix G are the possible solutions for this court to
consider.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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day of May 2001.

HOLMAN & WALKER, LC

D. Miles Holman
Attorneys for Defendants\Appellants Richard
M. Knapp, University Properties, Inc., and The
Haws Companies, dba The Haws Companies
Real Estate Services
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Blake S. Atkin #4466
Scott M. Lilja #4231
Jonathan L. Hawkins #5966
ATKIN 8c LILJA, P.C.
136 South Main, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 801-533-0300
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS CO., L.C.,
Plaintiff,
v.

JUDGMENT
(Modified)

GILBERT R. TURNER, RICHARD
M. KNAPP, UNIVERSITY PROPERTIES,
INC., a Utah corporation, THE
HAWS COMPANIES, a Utah
corporation, dba THE HAWS
COMPANIES REAL ESTATE SERVICES,
ROBERT M. WEST, JR. and JOHN
DOES 1 through 4,

Hon. James R. Taylor

Defendants.

Division V

Civil No. 930400136

This matter having come on for trial before a jury and
after hearing evidence, submissions of the parties and argument,
the jury rendering its verdict on February 28, 2000, and this
Court having received post-trial motions including a motion for
remittitur or in the alternative for new trial, which motion was
granted by this Court pursuant to the Memorandum Decision of this
Court dated June 8, 2000 (signed June 12, 2000), the Court enters
judgment as follows:
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all
previously entered judgments in this matter are hereby vacated
and stricken.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff
Diversified Holdings, Co., L.C. and against Defendants Gilbert R.
Turner, Richard M. Knapp, University Properties, Inc., and The
Haws Companies, dba The Haws Companies Real Estate Services,
jointly and severally, for fraud, in the amount of $71,336.00,
plus interest on the principal amount at the prejudgment rate of
10% per annum from June 24, 1992 to the date of judgment
thereafter at the judgment rate of 7.670% until paid in full.
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff
Diversified Holdings, Co., L.C. for negligence (not jointly and
severally) as follows:
1.

Against Defendant Gilbert R. Turner in the amount
of $26,000.00, plus interest on the principal
amount at the prejudgment rate of 10% per annum
from June 24, 1992 to the date of judgment
thereafter at the judgment rate of 7.670% until
paid in full,

2.

Against Defendant Richard M. Knapp in the amount
of $22,750.00, plus interest on the principal
amount at the prejudgment rate of 10% per annum
from June 24, 1992 to the date of judgment
thereafter at the judgment rate of 7.670% until
paid in full,
2
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3.

Against Defendant The Haws Companies dba The Haws
Companies Real Estate Services in the amount of
$16,250.00, plus interest on the principal amount
at the prejudgment rate of 10% per annum from June
24, 1992 to the date of judgment thereafter at the
judgment rate of 7.670% until paid in full.

Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff Diversified
Holdings, Co., L.C. for punitive and exemplary damages (not
jointly and severally) as follows:
1.

Against Defendant Gilbert R. Turner in the amount
of $208,257.00,

2.

Against Defendant Richard M. Knapp in the amount
of $500,000.00,

3.

Against Defendant University Properties, Inc. in
the amount of $214,000.00,

4.

Against Defendant The Haws Companies dba The Haws
Companies Real Estate Services in the amount of
$130,500.00,

plus interest on the principal amount at the judgment rate of
7.670% from and after the date of judgment until paid in full.
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-18-1(3) the Court
directs that 50% of the amount of punitive damages collected
from Defendants in excess of $20,000, after payment of attorneyfs
fees and costs, be remitted to the State Treasurer for deposit
into the general fund.

3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiff is awarded its costs in the amount of

DATED this

'/^

day of July, 2000.

BY THE COURT:

HON. JAMES R. TAYLOR
Fourth District Judge
d as to Form:
WALKER & HUTCHINGS

Y N. WALKER
ey for Defendants

4
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing
JUDGMENT (Modified) was mailed, postage prepaid, this 19th day of
July, 2000 to the following:
Jeffrey N. Walker
HOLMAN WALKER & HUTCHINGS
9527 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070
F. Richards Smith III
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84603
Gilbert R. Turner
4066 Worthington Drive
Park City, Utah 84060

$,L-,^A
judgment.mod
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SUJTI ,EMENTARY STATEMENT OF F\CTS
(Supplementing the Concise Statement of hicts Included i« ill*1 lltnlv 1/ t/§ h H'ISCIW"
Statement)

I

Si JI nvl Jiiu1 lil'liM *. S1 * 1 • I 1 \ I ()<>?.Wes Parrish ("Parrish") of plaintiff Diversified

• •- ^ n . arnroaehed by Gilbert Turner ("1 urner") regarding the Temple View Terrace
building. Turner asked Parrish if he was interested in renting space H • 1., ^ i wilding, U1 v\ 111111
Parrish replied that he was not. but migin .
be interested in putciKr-iiL: 1.

; ;avear

•••..

p

|

,

• :

i

..v/ 1 "--

:

^

!iMu- « ! ual Traiiaupt

).

^0;

1 urner represented himself to Parrish as a real estate agent affi.li.ated wil 11' I lie

Haws Companies. Parrish was the president and 0T» > ui Punish i lieinu M ' om|M'i,
Parrish is a scientist wiiii a r- • • ;,i organic cnemr- - a
chemistry. He had been ti p 1111 ipal in M: \ ompann

--

!

* 1'\ • ical

ri> addition to Parrish Chemical. v i . i .

ail -I'lji.

(c)

Boih i urner and Richard Knapp were licensed real estate agents affiliates -1111

The Haws Companies Turner became affiliated . . . . . .
28^
t .:

iia\\>uu... .... a:aaL:
; >!: • .* -

•

.

..!. .

1

-n-^v* -'K affiliation based upon
tnd trusted dev eloper and upon the previous experience

itl'Richarcl 1 laws ("1 laws"), who acted as principal broker for a company in which Ti irner
was affiliated as an associate broker. (T, T at 2fH) Knapp later became affiliated w;, ; a\s s
1
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Companies based upon 1 iirner's recommendation ai id based n lpoi 1 K napp's experience ii 1
doing his own uvil I'slntc ItaiiMt !i'»n\ ,"ii<* hi1* pieseiRT i" I Hah County.
(d)

R obert West, who was the principal broker of The Haws Companies, had

various discussions with Knapp about opening a brand* office of Tin- TTaws CompaHcs in
I Jtah County. Both Knapp and Turner were assigned cubicles a

... • uw\ s , mpai

* i

Salt T.ake ( ih

*

is

-r ii.K. ; . s. jver^iseti . ....

*

an . :OKC:

-

:

' ! he Haws Companies' oillcc in Suit Lake City, and sometimes used

* .•.;: -

, pp onb ' attei IC .' * • • those meetings. Turner conducted

a telephone and conference room at I Jniversity Properties' ("University") offi.ee n - i;iti
Count** iTT. at452Y During Knapp's a fti hat ion -a; ;

.ic . (l i.\M ompaniL--

i

••

.d

no business as an agent foi 1 1 le I la \ v s Coi i lpai lies, except foi tl le pi in: el l a s e !:T; ' I Jniversity
hupeilies of MM <ni»pi< N'M » \rvvih
.

*

.-

h *upp is the President and majority

- h o | der of University Properties. (' 1.1. ui 2 b 7;.
(ej

A Jormal agreement for \ bi audi Tfice of The Haws Companies a Utah

County was never reached, and althousjj- ; urnerwas licensed as a real es'lak" 'bfvikei , he WJPJ
never uesign.: - ^ a

; •

! T

;

t • -

•', r-*v\ \\ c si had regular

k U phone eoi iiLn I w itli "I uiner and KD:VT and met with them occasionally in Utah County,
but was not present in Utah County on a daih basis to supervise the activities of Turner and
Knapp in Utah County. (T T at 284).
(f)

,

-i^cussing a potential purchase ol Mir l<Mpli Virw Iriimr hull J' t7,
2
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Parrish told Turnei that he might need ;i parliici

' "iniei .aid Mi.il lie lvul i u"lvl >l '\li" nnyhl

be mieresled. ivkTring lo knapp Pan'isli l.itn intl Kn.ipp but ultimately both Knapp and
I finish decided nol to partner in the purchase. Parrish was acquainted with Don Wooley, and
the two had picw^Ubi} had discussions .-.Knit doiim some sort of real estate deal together.
(TT at 54x 'TT--.»1c\ was also ar nccompinhLv. ^ k ^ i h i aau /an.
s u u i i i h i . and .'M^ncss arMi.uc

i

ll

-

h < • ..

Vapermate Pen Compaq

imonj: other

• .

-«

li

i>

•-

uuishuieiiib, and ai^o had experience in real ^btate, ha\ ing previously bought and NOM

properties which he held for mil. Woolley had made good money as a scienlist, but. really
made his money in real estate, Parrish and Woolley eventually delemuiu'd ti pursue
purchase oi the bmiai:t. •;•..*
•* Kinrp was within a few days of I urner's visit to
parrjs|1

Knapp told Parrish that he (Knapp) was a law sti ident who did real estate on the

side. Knapp stated that at that time he was putting together a large real estate transaction.
K napp did not disclose that he was a reui estate ageitl

l

\u • i Ji a led kuapp i" kn.ipp w i

a real estak sale Lilian. and Knapp ti;->ptaided I'Ltl In; wa . imU but was taking a course and
plitnnnl on bei nnnnp an apentin the future. (IVI. at 56). [Knapp's testimony v\;is tiiai while
i lc did not disclose he was a licensed real eslale agent, lie ne\ er claimed not to be.] (! ! at
339).
(h)

At some poi

, r...

,n

•

1

•->•••
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.

• - • H'M *

Holdings Company and later added IMi. and I1 Ii \\ ooles ,is mcmheis nl 11 i;i1 'liiinl »l Hi ihillilr
compam . "'1 IKS IU/i.saii a pioccss ol'negolialing Hie purchase of the Temple View Terrace
buil Il mi11 i-» During the process of negotiation and up to the time of the purchase, there was no
disclosure that Knapp was a licensed real estate agent, that lie \\ as affiliated with The Haws
Companies, that there was any sort of partnership relabel,mp between Turner ;ind Knapp,
or that Turner stood to make any so:, ,

I i, mplr V irv, I rna- t1 trans,id i< HI

.;

o l l k ! l l l i i i l t i)11ll in ' ' n l l i a I i l i i

(i)

' • ».

Durn-; Mi:* iviotiation process, lurner iiiiurincd iJa iisli n a' lhe\ were

approaching a deadline where the propem was going to go to auction, and that he needed
$5,000.00 to prevent the auction
K napp had put up tnc
(j)

ik u ^ nelore the deadline

- ••

t

. \

s

y *•

'
:

-

<

.it
S).

* nui: wiase an option on the building, but University made

an oiler with cm earnest money payment of $5,000.00 to first Security Bank to purchase the
buikling for $650,000.00 A counter-offer was made, and I Jniversity and the Bank entered
into a contract for University to purchase the building ioi % 'uiiijilhi in

I iiiiinii completed

the eari: lest i none} sales agreei neiit ii i tl lis transaction ( I I ' at 59).
I i

"mere were various negotiations between Turner and Parrish. act in- UM'

plaintiff, on the purchase price of the building, which were not made very clear r+ 'rin1
Parrish testified that originally Turner presented him w n;. an earnest money agreement
disclosed a purchase pr^v

*

s

.

. .•
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.

:

directly with Knapp. I *arrish informe (I 111111ti (I">a 11) i \'en»i (i ei 1 w 11 s \ M 1111 \ }i (o k: I h • iapp ni;ikii
a % Mi 0011 Oil pmlil on lln ilr,ili ,iin! n niimialh aiii\cd .il a purchase price of $785,000.00.
Pannsh iiul Turner at tlie University office to sign the earnest money agreement. Knapp was
not present, but was in die Slate of Florida ai die lime, ^arri *h asked Turner what K iiapp's
option price \\a>. and Turner van] IK ..,- m>i *.•,-•

^mer pi... . . .

purportedly u» w.ap,

i" •

•*

i:

i

1

elephone. Knapp would call I urncr out d.u not

i-

-\e calls tioiii iurnci. Fairish heard Tamer's side ol the conversation, but could not

verify v. ho, ii t!>}oiKy w;h on die other -uV o r the telephone. ( x '] at • .

• ik: the

conversation, Turner told Parrish that K »-app's opi a ,i i p: _ • * a- ** *

e

earnest money agreement did nil euiiKim aim iu(itiiit»eiK * lelatinu to I linversih > profit but
: <.. • ,. )f $785,000.00, in Parrish's mind that figure represented
knapp s opiii^- price of $770,000,00, plus a $10,000.00 profit, plus the $5,000.00 which
Knapp had pui up lot the up!'oi= T T. at 62-63).
(1)
bargain

Parish Kiicu ....... the proper!y was dislivssed

|I

I",1 \\:r 1 'okini1 I'o1' a

1 lc i \(K etcd llie pun hast; prii r of (In building io be quite a bit lower, and he

, rdlhe value of the nrope?i^ to be lower than the $785,000.00 price, bui Tarrish testified
that 1 timer was a good salesman and talked him and Wooley into the purchase Diversilieu
1; ad oxpecledlHust Security Bank to pro\ UK a c op y of an appraisal on the o ..
Hank Un

• ,-.; appraisal

-r-

iv
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.• u ••.
«

pro', uie that appraisal, and so a new appraisal was i>blaiiud lui I ii\eisiliu,rs I'limnem^, ! Lit
appi i lis* d v alue< Ith< j n < iperl ;> ; it $900,000 0C ( I I ii .585).
(m)

I:>arrish asked ' I 'urner to represent Diversified, although a contract of

representation was never entered

Varrish helic\cd 'hal Turner was representing

Diversified b ' " :w\\ that prior to the closing Turner said he would IMI K o)inn>;*u,rie
representing 1 - u m k .
(n)
I

;! . ^

1

insiieliiiii I iinu m iiilnrmul hirnsh that there had to

- . .^000.00 payment made as earnest mone> to buy the property from First Security

Bank. Parrish provided a u ^ l r e r s cheek for $70,000 00 made payable to First Security
Bank. Plaintiffs earnest money agreement pro\ uiui Uki > vv^s purchasing me pi op*.. * :i--n
I IniversityProper ties,Inc.
I Jni\ ersity Properties ai id

•
• • ' *•.

.•

» •

•• • ^JU\ * - -

. ; squired a pa\ ment of $70,OUo

• •••!
did

not know that its $70,000.00 payment was "being made in fulfillment M i! ii contractual
obligation. ;T ~ a! ''*")

(o)

V some point in the negotiation process. I ,:i.i hask^u i urnet v ., »-... .

d

price w oi lid be $700,000.00. I 'urner replied that another party came in with an offer of
$750,000.00, and so Knapp had to beat that price. Parrish asked why Knapp did not just
offer $755,000 no and. Turner replied that the bank liked the other party's offer more than
K^pp

-, ui »u i. u;. it was prepared to take the other pai t:> "s offei i mless K napp offered
6
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substantially more. ('*
(p)

As tf le closing approacl led. W ooley was short $50,000.00 for the purchase of

tin: building, He had arranged to borrow the $50,000.00 from a lender at 18% interest per
annum. Turner in formed the plaintiff thai he K. * mid eel M v $50/10° no for Wooley at a better
rate, andPaiTishtnld Turneri/ul thevwoulo *u. iim, .; tu . ,., ..Mu .
M .. ,\napp wi ..

:

*' ••-

nrale I iiinci Mud

•
•• • *

msln ailed kiupp,

^ere on a thin • v. i da\ note at 10°/ b. Although

neither Knapp nor Turner had stated 10% "pa annum," Parrish understood that the 10%
figure icpreseue.! an annual peieentaue rate. (T T at 72). Knapp understood: " - K

10%

flat rate. (T.T at 343). When Parrish arrived at the closh lg, V'V ooley \ v as late ai id I 'arrish
examined • ; . ' - .
pr- - -

^

•: * ontained a Hat fee
uun ice ui 1 U5/u ui the principal amount) rather than a . 0% interest

rate. Parrish was uncertain what to do, but ultimately decided to go ahead and close the
transaction, then go back after the 18% interest rate. \\ hen w came time loi • .versified to
p a v o f : IIV iw». ; . .i p r o t e s t e d u K i u i p p a i - i.: = -. *

• •

: y

,i per diem mines! rale based npi'ii ,i l'i im nl \(f\\ pel month ur ; v , ^^cd o per annum),
which kna^p aureed to accept, and Diversified paid the sum of $1,336.00 in mtercsi . - ihc
$50,000.00 loan. <TT. a! "-7-1).
(q)

Prior to closing the transaction, Knapp learned that I urnerhad iiiiMepic snitul

to Parrish the amoi iiit ol pi ul il i\ lin 1« 1 l\rui A\\ lYopnlies WHS I,1 make on lln tnitiMhliun
7
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1 Ipon learning this, Ivnapp (old 1 iiniei he was nol invulval, and Ilia! Il iinni had Ibi/lln liinpe

misrepresentation to Diversified or to anyone else. ( i . 1. ai 348-49).
(r)

At the closing; Parrish began to feel uneasy and to suspect that something was

"not right," The terms of the $50,000.00 note, combine w m the demeanor *< -lu people
i n t h e r o o m . I . I ' H V Q I l i b :-.li'»piuulri

llli

I r i i l m ' d iLiI illliu

>M

IIIH

JIOMIIIL.'Y, x l n

lint*

Di\ ersified's pi n cl lase and oi le fori Jniversity's purchase.,, and he asked to be present at the
University closing with First Security Bank, but his request was denied. The people he asked
questions ofwere evasive and this made him feel uneasN Tie decided to go ahead w:th the
closing and later investigate, ins >uspiciun.^

though the earnr

i itii-. *\\ -

•... , J,... iu '->\ent .i * .,:

.

me

e\ ai??cement Diversified naJ entered into did not provide that the

$70,000.00 was non-refundable. (1 /I at 79-80).
(s)

The Ernest Money Agreement between I Jniversity and Diversified contains the

following language:
]\uaiii\i

'

:

COMPLETE AGREEMENT - NU ORAL AGREEMENTS. This insti ument
constitutes the entire agreement between flu- /dirties and supersedes and
cancels any ami all prior negotiations, representations, n warranties,
una

i';!,'1

n« agreements

*
8
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I ,

agreement

/// muaijy ui >; -

J_•*.-*/..

:v

(Emphasis added;. There \\a& no tesliniuii) oi cwdeiux of any corporate act of University
taken by any person other than K napp, who was an ei nplo^ ee of University and its 99%
shareholder,
(t)

K i lapp earned a • :< :)i i n nissi- : n : i 1 the I Jni < - ersit;; ' pi u chase.,, bi it iti : t : n the

Diversified pi irehase I i u: i ler and University (acting through Knarriaareedthat Turner and
University w ould evenly split the profit made on the sale to Diversified (I .T. at 304), which
AVU*- eoniran

to Tie rules governing licensed real estate professionals. (T.T. at 431) Turner

was also p«no
].*

- v ^ , > ^iiii.ji.i^M^i, - • Aa^aicii u ..

-r-i'u

-

m the loan wliiJII) I mml Ilo
Isn I'uiili'.nii

mnii 11 ii ival estate

licensure rules . ' 1. at 430-31).
(u)

After the closing of ihc transaction, Wooley and Parrish wenl i<. • The ITaws

Companies1 office in Salt Lake City to ask questions and complain about the transaction..

I [ni\ (M'sitvM >i\ ersi fird Imns.iel u m was contemplated until after it was closed. No one at The
Haws Companies knew the University\Diversified transaction had closed, but believing it to
be a real estate sale effected by one of its agents, asked where its commission was. I laws
Companies communicated by letter to Rimer and Knapp demai iding documentation and
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not take any other action to lr\ and salish plnmlill I I I al J"4 v-1 /" I.
I1"1''!'! (" iilllir i l(i>,||i|> n| i|n lijiisadinn hrhuvn MnivwMh JIM«I niwiMlied,

(v)

Haws Companies discovered. h v opening mail received at its office and addressed to Turner,
that Punier wib under investigation K i ie Suite Real Estate Division for failing to i el urn
earnest money which he had received from., a client at a -imc A hen i urner was not a: incited
v •

, . ; k.\>. Jompanit

]

- -

'-s

Usoi nepoh it < < > itl 1 :II it the ki i :) w ledge of I 'he I law sCoi i lpai lies,
II) I

• ^iitution of the earnest money

he had failed to return. Turner lost his license as a real estate broker as a result of the state
investigation, but retained a license as a real estate agent (T.T. at 314).
(V)

,

Almost immediate!) upon learning ui ilk rci*v;i;.L disciplinary jviio:;

i( f1

)r t 0

aws

faQ closing ofthis transaction, although Turner did not submit

a change card io the Di\ lsion of Real Estate indicating il »</ lermination of his ,j ffiliat H ?P with
Ilaws and his new afniiation with a different broker until after the closing of this transaction.
i I il ,ii 4X4. y>i) :-,/K
(x)

]\\ AIILIISI .M
' l I**')' Huns ( 'ninpiiiiies li.nl Irmned Ihat I )iversified was

complaining about this transaction, and after learning of that, Haws Companies terminated
its affiliation with Knapp t'TT. aN~r T .
(y)

.

Diversiiied chose to aflinn ilk ^ik u- -.a* property and not rescind the

transaction v<

. .

p ^J

y Di\ ersified i etained the
l- ::
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property and at the same time sued for fraud for being induced into the purchase of the
property.
(z)

The jury was not allowed to hear testimony that Diversified (by a successor)

took the property that it had purchased in June 1992 for $785,000.00 and sold it in May 1996
for $1,200,000.00. Further, the jury was precluded from hearing testimony that Knapp's
tender of recission of the transaction was refused.
(aa)

Richard Knapp was relatively youthful at the time of the conduct, being only

26 years old.(R. at 2084). There was no evidence that Richard Knapp had done the conduct
that he was accused of doing prior to this incident or after the incident.(R). Richard Knapp
was not an active real estate agent and in fact had done only one (1) real estate transaction
as an agent prior to that time and none after that time.(T.T. at 331). Richard Knapp had a less
active role and passive role in the transaction than did Gilbert Turner.(R. at 2092). Parish
testified that Knapp never made a misrepresentation regarding the transaction.(T.T. at 167).
Richard Knapp surrendered his real estate licence to the licencing agency and has not
received or applied for a reinstatement of his licence. Therefore, Richard Knapp cannot be
in a position to perpetrate the same conduct in the future. Richard Knapp was terminated by
Haws over the conduct that resulted in the punitive damage award. (T.T. at 249).
(bb)

Richard Knapp sought to rescind the transaction when there was concern that

the plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the transaction.(T.T. at 11).
(cc)

With regard to defendant University specifically, University participated in the
11
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wrongful conduct only through Richard Knapp.(R. at 2079). University sole participation
was to own the property prior to the sale to the Diversified.(Id.) There was no evidence of
University's wealth. (Id.)
(dd)

With regard to defendant Haws Companies specifically, Haws Companies

terminated Richard Knapp over the conduct that resulted in the punitive damage award.(T.T.
at 249). Haws Companies terminated Gilbert Turner before this conduct that resulted in the
punitive damage award became known to Haws Companies when other unrelated
improprieties that were unrelated to Haws Companies came to light.(T.T. at 202). The jury
verdict against Haws for punitive damages is roughly 25% of its net worth.(R. at 2076).
Haws Companies never received any remuneration for the sale transaction between
Diversified and University.
(ee)

With regard to defendant Gilbert Turner specifically, Gilbert Turner

surrendered his real estate licence to the licencing agency and has not received or applied for
a reinstatement of his licence.(R. at 2090). Therefore, Gilbert Turner cannot be in a position
to perpetrate the same conduct in the future.(Id.) No evidence of Gilbert Turner's wealth was
submitted to the jury.(R. at 2093).
(ff)

Based upon the foregoing, the jury initially awarded the following damages to

Diversified:
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Defendant

Fraud

Punitive

Ratio
(ctob)

Negligence,;

Total (b+c+e)

Turner

$71,336.00

$2,250,000.00

30.6 to 1

$84,000.00

$2,405,336.00

Knapp

$71,336.00

$1,750,000.00

23.8 to 1

$73,500.00

$1,821,336.00

University

$71,336.00

$1,000,000.00

13.6 to 1

$-0-

$1,071,000.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$130,500.00

1.7 to 1

$52,500.00

$254,336.00

BSSBISHHEBBI1RH HBHHiHHHHIl

ll^ljlllllijllpl
(gg) The trial court judge reviewed the matter on a motion for new trial and remitted
the judgment, offering Diversified a new trial or to accept the remitted judgment, to the
following:
;: a.- :'
Defendant

Fraud

Turner

Punitive

d.
Ratio
(ctob)

' .e.
Negligence

Total (b+c+e)

$71,336.00

$208,257.00

2.9 to 1

$26,000.00

$305,593.00

Knapp

$71,336.00

$500,000.00

7tol

$22,750.00

$594,086.00

University

$71,336.00

$214,000.00

3 to 1

$-0-

$285,336.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$130,500.00

1.8 to 1

$16,250.00

$218,086.0(M

Total:

$71,336.00

$1,052,757,00

14.75 to 1

$65,000.00

$1,403,101.00 |

2

Diversified choose not to retry the matter and accepted the remittitur.

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.
This amount is joint and several with all defendants.
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FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court /,
of Utah County, State ot Utah

^
i,,,,

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURt
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Diversified Holdings Co., L.C.,
Plaintiff

:
:

Memorandum Decision

vs.

:

Date: June 8,2000

Gilbert R. Turner, et. al.,

:

Case Number: 930400136

Defendant

:

Division V: Judge James & Taylor

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants Richard M. Knapp,
University Properties, Inc. and The Haws Companies for a new trial or, in the alternative, a
remittitur of damages. Those three Defendants have asked that the motion be extended to include
the judgment against the additional Defendant Gilbert R. Turner which was allowed by this Court.
The Defendants do not challenge, by this motion, the jury verdict except as to separate damages
for negligence, an apparent award of damages for interest on money loaned to the Plaintiff by
Defendant Richard Knapp in connection with the subject transaction and the amount of punitive
damages awarded.
Rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a verdict to be set aside if there
is insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. "A trial court cannot grant a new trial if there is
sufficient evidence to support a verdict for either party and the judge merely disagrees with the
judgment of the jury. Mere disagreement is not a sufficient basis on which to set aside a verdict
and order a new trial," Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 189 at 799 (Utah, 1991).
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A trial court may set aside a verdict and grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to the clear
weight of the evidence, or whenever in the exercise of a sound discretion the trial judge thinks this
action necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice, Id. at 803.
The Utah Supreme Court has noted, in Crookston supra at 813 that:
A trial judge, in proposing a remittitur or additur, only does so as an alternative to
granting a new trial. This is true because a trial judge may only remit the damages
if he or shefindsthem excessive or add to them if he or shefindsthem
inadequate-which is one of the grounds for granting a new trial. Thus, if a plaintiff
does not want to accept the proposed remittitur, he or she may elect to retry the
matter.
In considering a challenge to a jury verdict on the basis of insufficient evidence under Rule
59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure this Court must construe the evidence in favor of
the verdict. In this case the jury was asked to determine if there wasfraudand/or negligent
misrepresentation. They were also instructed and asked to determine if the defendants had
breached a standard of care under a simple negligence theory. Both questions were answered
affirmatively. Those conclusions are not challenged by this motion. The jury then determined
that damages of $71,336.00 resultedfromthefraudand/or negligent misrepresentation. The next
question put to the jury asked them to ". . . state the amount of additional damages, if any,
sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the negligence" (Emphasis added).
As this Court views the evidence, the fundamentalfraudclaim was that the defendants lied
and misrepresented the price Mr. Knapp or his corporation, Defendant University Properties, paid
for the property being sold to the Plaintiff and they lied about, misrepresented or hid the nature of
Page 2 of
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their interest and role in the transaction. Such behavior could certainly have been characterized as
simple negligence, as well. However, Mr. Parrish testified that he expected to pay much less for
the building than he did. He was shocked and surprised at thefinalnumber but, by then, felt
compelled to complete the deal because he had committed $70,000.00 at the insistence of Mr.
Turner. His estimate of the proper purchase price wasfirststated at $600,000.00 to $700,000.00
then revised to $650,000.00 to $700,000.00.
The negligence, apartfromthe outright misrepresentation, that occurred in this case
resulted in the failure of the defendants to professionally represent the Plaintiff as real estate
professionals to obtain the most reasonable price possible for the property. Stated differently,
this jury could have concluded that had the defendants acted professionally, they might have
negotiated the price Mr. Parrish expected, resulting in a purchase price of $650,000.00 instead of
$785,000.00. That is a difference of $135,000.00. Of that, $70,000.00 was the inflated amount
created by the misrepresentation andfraud.$1,336.00 exactly corresponds to the interest or fee
charged on the loan for $50,000.00 which the Plaintiff argued and the jury apparently found to be
anotherfraudulentscheme. The remaining difference in purchase price would then be
$65,000.00. There was no other evidence of damage presented or argued to the jury. The jury
award of $210,000.00 for "additional damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate
result of the negligence" cannot, therefore be sustained beyond the amount of $65,000.00.
Accordingly, a remittitur to the award for negligence in the amount of $145,000.00 will be
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allowed to bring the total amount awarded as damages for negligence to $65,000.00.
Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a trial court can also
grant a new trial if the damages awarded are "excessive [in amount].. . appearing to have been
given under the influence of passion or prejudice." In Crookston. supra, the Utah Supreme Court
created a presumption that if the ratio of punitive damages to actual damages exceeds a specified
ratio, they are excessive and must be supported by specificfindingsof the trial court to be
sustained.
Any motion for a new trial on the question of punitive damages requires that the
trial court engage in a two-part inquiry: (i) whether punitives are appropriate at all,
i.e. whether the evidence is sufficient to support a lawful juryfindingof
defendant's requisite mental state,... and (ii) whether the amount of punitives is
excessive or inadequate, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice. Id. at 807.
The Defendants do not challenge the verdict under part i of the Crookston process. They
rely, in total, upon the ratio of damages awarded to punitive damages to support their claim that
the punitive damages are excessive.
Seven factors have been outlined to be considered in assessing the amount of punitive
damages including: 1) the relative wealth of the defendant, 2) the nature of the alleged
misconduct, 3) the facts and circumstances surrounding such conduct, 4) the effect thereof on the
lives of the plaintiff and others, 5) the probability of future recurrence of the misconduct, 6) the
relationship of the parties and, 7) the amount of actual damages awarded. The damages awarded
against each of the Defendants will be considered in the framework of the seven identified factors.
Page 4 o f
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Gilbert R. Turner
The jury awarded damages against Mr. Turner as follows:
Fraud or negligent misrepresentation:

$71,336.00

Additional damages as a proximate result of negligence:

$26,000.00

Money received through violation of UCA 61-2-11

$ 41,502.00

Punitive Damages

$2,250,000.00

The damages awarded forfraudor negligent misrepresentation are joint and several with
the other defendants. The additional damages proximately resultingfromnegligence are
apportionedfroma total of $65,000.00, reducedfromthe verdict amount as noted above. After
receiving the verdict the Plaintiffs elected to receive punitive damages rather than an award based
upon the money received through a violation of U.C.A. section 61-2-11. Interest accrues on the
various amounts at the statutory rate of interest (7.670% per annum).
I. Relative Wealth of Richard Turner
The Utah Supreme Court identified, as the first factor to be considered, the "relative
wealth of the Defendant." Relative to whom? In this case Mr. Turner appears to be the least
wealthy of any of the Defendants. No evidence was presented at any time identifying any net
worth of Mr. Turner although he was a real estate broker for a substantial time in California
before coming to Utah. In California he owned his own business. He appears to have a home in
Park City although there was no evidencefromwhich the Court can determine that he owned,
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rented or borrowed the property. In the months just preceding the subject transaction in 1992,
Mr. Turner got into trouble for appropriating $5,000.00 from a trust account. He borrowed the
money to repay the accountfromMr. Knapp. Although Mr. Turner appeared on thefirstday of
trial and asserted a need for support and travel expenses to come to the trial, there is no other
evidence to support any substantial conclusion about Mr. Turner's wealth, relative to anybody.
II. The Nature of the Misconduct of Richard Turner
Mr. Turner's conduct in this case was core to thefraudthat was perpetrated upon the
Plaintiff. Mr. Turner drafted the contract for the purchase, by Mr. Knapp, of the subject property
from First Security Bank. He then lied to the Plaintiffs by feigning a lack of knowledge about the
purchase pricefromFirst Security Bank and then pretended to call Mr. Knapp to set the re-sale
price to the Plaintiffs at $785,000.00. He did not cooperate with his broker, the Haws Company,
to allow adequate supervision. He knew that Mr. Knapp was a licensed agent, having introduced
Mr. Knapp to the Haws Company for that purpose and yet he kept that fact awayfromthe
Plaintiffs. He took a kick-back fee from a bank to arrangefinancingfor the Plaintiff. He offered
and carried out the motions as if to represent the Plaintiff but acted as an agent for Richard
Knapp, University Properties and himself, ultimately splitting profitsfromthe resale of the
building to the plaintiffs. He plainly lied about the reason for the price by saying that a third party
had offered $750,000.00 for the building. He took advantage of the Plaintiffs short term need for
cash to close the deal by manipulating a request for money under circumstances any reasonable
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person would have interpreted as a desire for a loan at 10% per annum into a loan at 120% per
annum. In short virtually all of the deception that occurred in this case was carried out through
the lies, statements and activity of Mr. Turner acting by himself or in concert with other
defendants.
HI. The Facts and Circumstances of the Case
The facts and circumstances of the case, as related to Mr. Turner, are largely described in
the preceding paragraph. After committing the Plaintiff to the purchase by obtaining a nonrefundable deposit he used the same money to commit First Security Bank to sell to Mr. Knapp
thereby insuring substantial profit with little or no cash outlay for himself or Mr. Knapp. He
managed to obtain, in addition to a 50% share of the profitsfromthe sale, a real estate
commission on both deals and a kickbackfromthe bank providing funding for the Plaintiff. All
the while he represented himself to the Plaintiff as their agent.
IV. The Effect Upon the Lives of the Plaintiff and Others
The only evidence received regarding the effect of this transaction upon the Plaintiff was
that the profit they subsequently realized was reduced by the amount they were defrauded in the
purchase of the building. Nothing regarding the re-sale of the building was presented to the jury.
An expert witness testified as to three possible values of the building, all substantially more than
either purchase price. However it was demonstrated in cross examination that some of the data
relied upon by the appraiser may have been flawed. There was no other evidence of the impact of
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this conduct upon the lives of Plaintiffs or others.
V. The Probability of Future Recurrence of the Misconduct
Mr. Turner has surrendered his real estate license. He was the subject of discipline for an
earlier indiscretion and appears to be chronically unable to tell the truth. Most witnesses who
knew of him indicated that he has a penchant for half truths and misrepresentation. He has been
in the real estate business for a substantial period of time. Nevertheless, unless he simply ignores
the licensing laws of the State and attempts to act as a broker or agent without a license, it is
unlikely that he will be in a situation for this conduct to be repeated. He appears to have no real
estate license or position. There is not a high probability of this conduct being repeated by Mr.
Turner.
VI. The Relationship of the Parties
Mr. Turner's principal asset appears to be the ability to sell. He was hired and used by
Mr. Knapp when Mr. Knapp was concerned that others might not accept him as legitimate
because of his age. He ingratiated himself to Mr. Parrish and convinced him of the need to
purchase the building and make a profit. He befriended Mr. Knapp and appears to have gained
the confidence of Richard Haws, even though an investigation into his practices began just before
Mr. Haws transferred his license to the Haws Companies. However, other than those
relationships in the general business context, there is no evidence in this case of relationships that
would impact a punitive damage award.
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VII. The Amount of Actual Damages Awarded
In comparing the damages awarded to the amount of punitive damages the Supreme Court
in the second Crookston case, 860 P.2d 937 at 940 (1993) noted that "[s]oft compensatory
damages, "which must be awarded with caution," . . . are not to be given equal weight with hard
compensatory damages when evaluating the relationship between punitive and compensatory
damages." This case did not involve any damages identified as general or resultingfrompain and
suffering. As noted above, there was not evidence on that point. The Plaintiff was led to believe
that they were purchasing the building for $15,000 more than Mr. Knapp had paid for the
building, repaying his $5,000.00 "unrefiindable" payment for the option and allowing a
$10,000.00 profit. Mr. Parrish expected to pay much less for the building, estimating the value at
$650,000.00 to $700,000.00. There was testimony that the $5,000.00 was returned to Mr.
Turner by the bank when he delivered the $70,000.00 obtained from the Plaintiff. Mr. Knapp said
he never received the money and no other explanation of what happened to that money was
presented.
The verdict form required the jury to determine, first, if the Defendants committed the
torts offraudand negligent misrepresentation. It called for a determination of an amount that
would reasonably compensate the Plaintiff for the injury caused. That amount was set by the jury
at $71,336.00. The jury was then asked to apportion the simple negligence among the defendants
Mr. Turner, Mr. Knapp, Mr. West and the Haws Companies, all of whom were real estate
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professionals. Mr. Turner's responsibility was set at 40%. Since the damage resulting from
negligence has been remitted to a reasonable measure of the actual cost of the unprofessional
representation, the negligence damages are considered to be "hard." Interest accumulated since
the date of judgment accrues after the judgment was entered and was not determined by the jury.
Consequently, it cannot be considered in reviewing the jury verdict to determine if the award was
reasonable. The Plaintiff elected to not receive any award resultingfromthe statutory violation.
That leaves, for Mr. Turner, a total of $97,336.00 in compensatory damages to be compared to
punitive damages of $2,250,000.00. The ratio is approximately 1 to 23.
Summary: Gilbert R. Turner
To review the 7 Crookston factors: 1) There is no evidencefromwhich the jury or this
Court can conclude anything about the relative wealth of Mr. Turner; 2) Mr. Turner's conduct
was substantially egregious and core to thefraudthat was perpetrated upon the Plaintiff; 3) Mr.
Turner manipulated and took advantage of the circumstances to carry out thefraud;4) there was
no evidence of substantial impact upon the lives of the Plaintiff or others; 5) there is a low
probability that Mr. Turner will engage in this sort of conduct in the future because there is no
evidence that he will have any opportunity to do so, 6) there was no evidence of unusual or
sensitive relationships other than created in a business environment related to thisfraud,and, 7)
the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, 1 to 23, is extreme.
With regard to Mr. Turner, this Court concludes that punitive damages of $2,250,000.00

Page 10 of

26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

is extreme and unnecessarily high. The amount clearly exceeds the proper ratio established by the
Supreme Court for punitive damages. The evidence of Mr. Turner's knowledge and malice was
substantial. The actions were certainly not benign. There is no evidence, one way or the other, as
to whether the award would risk bankrupting Mr. Turner although a man who demands car fare
to come to court would probably have a difficult time paying well over two million in damages.
Even though the Plaintiff elected to not receive compensationfromthe violation of the statute
governing conduct of real estate agents, that statute would have allowed a penalty of up to three
times the compensation received by virtue of the tainted conduct. The jury determined that
compensation to be $41,502.00 for Mr. Turner. The possible penalty would have been
$124,506.00. A 1 to 3 ratio, as approved by the Supreme Courtfromcompensatory damages
would put punitive damages at $292,008.00. This Court is satisfied, primarily because Mr.
Turner is unlikely to have an opportunity to repeat this conduct, that an appropriate penalty is
somewhere between those amounts. Accordingly, this Court will authorize a remittitur to the
punitive damages portion of the award against Mr. Turner of $2,041,743.00 resulting in a total
punitive damage award of $208,257.00.
Richard M. Knapp
The jury awarded damages against Mr. Knapp as follows:
Fraud or negligent misrepresentation:

$71,336.00

Additional damages as a proximate result of negligence:

$22,750.00
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Money received through violation of UCA 61-2-11

$ 60,946.00

Punitive Damages

$1,750,000.00

The damages awarded forfraudor negligent misrepresentation are joint and several with
the other defendants. The additional damages proximately resultingfromnegligence are
apportionedfroma total of $65,000.00, reduced as noted above. After receiving the verdict the
Plaintiflfs elected to receive punitive damages rather than an award based upon the money received
through a violation of U.C.A. section 61-2-11. Interest accrues on the various amounts at the
statutory rate of interest (7.670% per annum).
I. The Relative Wealth of Richard Knapp
As a contrast to Mr. Turner, Mr. Knapp appears to be the most wealthy of any of the
Defendants. Expert testimony placed his net worth at more than five million, estimated
conservatively. He testified that he closed on the purchase of a 311 unit apartment building five
months after the deal with the Plaintiffs which was a 16.5 million dollar deal requiring a million
dollars down. Although he told Mr. Turner that he couldn't or wouldn't pay the $70,000.00
down if the Plaintiff didn't, he testified that he had access to that amount of cash and now
regularly makes real estate loans for which he charges a 10% fee plus 18% per annum. He
testified that he currently owns more than 1,000 rental units in three states. When the transaction
with the Plaintiff was done Mr. Knapp, although a full time law student and MBA candidate at
B YU, owned a 96 unit rental property, two convenience stores, a circuit board manufacturing
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company and the building used by University Properties. He was and is a 90% owner of
University Properties.
The principal parties for the Plaintiff were not poor men. Wes Parrish was CEO of Parish
Chemical, a company he founded and principally owns. He owns or was involved with 6 other
companies and had substantial business experience. His partner, Don Wooley, had substantial
experience as a scientist for a series of major corporations. He invented the "FLAIR" pen for
Papermate. He worked for McDonald-Douglas and Hercules Corp. although, by his own
admission, had not made money in those positions. Mr. Wooley felt he had made money in real
estate. Through his deposition he established that he had bought and sold several residences, a
duplex, a four-plex and a six-plex. At the time of his deposition he owned a home and a
condominium in Santa Clara. He felt he had cash to contribute to the Plaintiff to put together this
purchase although his inability to obtain $50,000.00 of the funds needed by the time for closing
led to the need to borrow that amountfromMr. Knapp.
II. The Nature of the Misconduct of Mr. Knapp
Mr. Knapp, while attending law and business school at BYU became heavily involved in
the purchase, sale and management of real property. In an effort to avoid paying real estate
commissions, he obtained a real estate sales license. Out of a desire to "put in the time" to make
it possible to obtain a broker's license, he "hung his license" with the Haws Companies but
affirmatively avoided training or supervision. He negotiated an unusually favorable commission
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split with the Haws Companies specifically including in the contract that he would maintain a
"branch office" in Provo. The commission split was claimed by him and honored by the Haws
Companies. This Court concludes that the balance of the contract was in force and that Mr.
Knapp made his University Properties office available for the use of Mr. Turner and the Haws
Companies pursuant to that agreement.
Mr. Knapp was thefirstof any of the parties to notice that the Temple View Terrace
property was for sale in April of 1992. He had utilized Mr. Turner on an unspecified number of
previous deals because Mr. Turner gave credibility to his position. Mr. Turner was older,
presented himself well and gave an impression of confidence and maturity. Mr. Knapp was a 26
year old student who had done very well in real estate development but, frankly, looked his age.
Mr. Knapp instructed Mr. Turner to obtain information about the building. Mr. Knapp reviewed
the information and determined that it was a distressed sale and felt he could make money by
purchasing the property. He approved the earnest money offer to purchasefromFirst Security
Bank that was prepared by Mr. Turner. He also directed and approved the sale to the Plaintiff.
He met with Mr. Parrish on the site and did not disclose that he was an agent with the same
agency as Mr. Turner or that he had a partnership to share in the proceedsfromthe sale of the
building to the Plaintiff. He created artificial pressure on Mr. Turner by telling him that he would
not pay the $70,000.00 down payment to First Security Bank requiring Mr. Turner to take
whatever steps were possible to commit the Plaintiff to paying the money. When Mr. Knapp

Page 14 of

26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

learned that Mr. Turner had been untruthful, instead of acting promptly to rectify the misunderstanding or instructing Mr. Turner to tell the truth, he did nothing but hope the Plaintiff
didn't discover the truth. Mr. Knapp affirmatively instructed the title company on the day both
deals closed to keep the purchase price paid for the propertyfromthe Plaintifif. Mr. Knapp knew
the nature of the deal. He created or approved of the structure and benefittedfromit.
HI. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Conduct
The facts and circumstances with regard to Mr. Knapp are substantially the same as
described above as relating to Mr. Turner or implicitfromthe recitation of the conduct of Mr.
Knapp.
IV. The Effect of the Misconduct on the Lives of the Plaintifif or Others
Mr. Turner has, perhaps appropriately, lost his ability to continue in his vocation as a real
estate professional because he found himself used and manipulated by Mr. Knapp. By contrast,
the loss of the status as "real estate professional" will have little or no impact upon Mr. Knapp
since he always has viewed the designation as a convenience or sideline and not his principal
vocation. As noted above, the Plaintiff has suffered an economic loss by being required to pay
more for the building than they should have with the misconduct of Mr. Knapp.
V. The Probability of Future Recurrence of the Misconduct
The evidence leads this Court to a substantial concern in this area with regard to Mr.
Knapp. He has created a large net worth in a short time through real estate investment and
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dealing. He demonstrated an incredibly arrogant and uncaring attitude on the stand when asked
about the lies and half-truths propounded by Mr. Turner as his behest. In spite of his training as a
real estate professional, completion of law school and a degree in business administration he
appears to be perfectly willing to place an opportunity for personal profit ahead of ethical fair
dealing. Once the jury in this case had determined that punitive damages were warranted by the
evidence, he absented himselffromthe proceedings. He was not present during evidence or
argument related to the proper amount of punitive damages. That behavior was not lost on the
jury or the Court. This Court concludes that unless Mr. Knapp changes his conduct and attitude
that a very real possibility exists that Mr. Knapp will seek and exploit circumstances such as this
on a future occasion.
VI. The Relationship of the Parties
Mr. Parrish was and is an experienced scientist and businessman. Mr. Wooley considered
himself knowledgeable in real estate matters but, particularly in comparison with the Defendants,
was also relatively inexperienced. He noted that he relied upon real estate professionals,
accountants and lawyers when dealing in such matters. Mr. Knapp had or was receiving
substantial training about the intricacies of real estate transactions. Mr. Turner was a very
competent salesman capable of being manipulated by Mr. Knapp. The Haws Companies were
perfectly willing to associate Mr. Knapp and Mr. Turner to benefit through commissionsfromthe
real estate business Mr. Knapp was involved in andfromhaving a "presence" in the Provo area
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through a branch office but not in providing substantive training and supervision. These
relationships combined to make thefraudestablished in this case possible. Mr. Knapp, in
particular, fostered and took advantage of relationships with co-defendants for his own particular
profit.
VII. The Amount of Actual Damages Awarded
The jury concluded that damages attributable to Mr. Knapp included $71,336.00fromthe
fraud/negligent misrepresentation. The negligence damages have been reduced by this decision to
$22,750.00. Punitive Damages against Mr. Knapp totaled $1,750,000.00. Following the
computation explained for Mr. Turner, above, the totals are $94,086.00 to $1,750,000.00 for a
ratio of about 1 to 19.
Summary: Richard Knapp
To review the 7 Crookston factors regarding Mr. Knapp: 1) Mr. Knapp is most likely the
most wealthy of any of the parties (although there was no evidencefromwhich the Court can
conclude the net worth of Mr. Parrish or Mr. Wooley). 2) Mr. Knapp knowingly initiated and
took advantage of the fiill scheme to defraud the Plaintiff. His conduct was extensive and
egregious. 3) The circumstances surrounding the conduct were manipulated and utilized by Mr.
Knapp to facilitate the fraud. 4) The Plaintiff was forced to spend more on the property than it
wanted. Mr. Turner, who certainly was not blameless, ended up unable to engage in a profession
that appears to have been his main vocation for some time. Mr. Knapp and his general business
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interests, except for the impact of this judgment, are largely unaffected. 5) Unless forced to
change his business practices and outlook there is a substantial possibility that Mr. Knapp will
seek and take advantage of similar circumstances in the future. 6) Mr. Knapp accomplished much
of thefraudin this case by creating and manipulating special relationships-particularly with other
defendants. 7) Damages awarded by the jury as compared to punitive damages were in a ratio of
about 1 to 19 which substantially exceeds the Supreme Court guidelines.
The punitive damage award exceeded the proper ratio but Mr. Knapp's behavior was
knowing and active. He does not run a substantialriskof bankruptcyfromthe damages awarded.
Because Mr. Knapp's behavior was so key to this scheme and because of the need to create a
disinclination for such conduct to be repeated, this Court concludes that although punitive
damages in the amount awarded by the jury are excessive, the damages should exceed the 1 to 3
ratio guideline established by the Supreme Court. This Court concludes that punitive damages in
the amount of $500,000.00 are reasonable and just. His total judgment, in that circumstance,
would be approximately 10% of his conservative net worth. This is not an amount intended to
bankrupt but, instead, to send a very strong message regarding future conduct. A remittitur, then,
of $1,250,000.00 will be authorized to reduce the punitive damage award against Mr. Knapp to
$500,000.00.
University Properties
The jury awarded damages against University Properties as follows:
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Fraud or negligent misrepresentation:

$71,336.00

Punitive Damages

$1,000,000.00

The damages awarded forfraudor negligent misrepresentation are joint and several with
the other defendants.
I. Relative Wealth of University Properties
There was no evidence of the relative value of University Properties. Richard Knapp is or
was a 90% owner of the company and it is presumed that the value of the company is included in
the assessment of his net worth.
II. The Nature of the Alleged Misconduct of University Properties
As the jury was instructed, a corporation may only act through it's agents. In this case
Richard Knapp took actions attributable to University Properties when he cause the company to
purchase the propertyfromFirst Security Bank and then almost immediately re-sell the property
to the Plaintiffs making afraudulentprofit (and, at the same time, earning a real estate
commission for Mr. Knapp). There was no testimony or evidence of any corporate act of
University Properties taken by any person other than Mr. Knapp.
IQ. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Conduct
There is nothing regarding facts and circumstances related to University Properties that
differsfromthe explanation given above for Mr. Knapp.
IV. The Effect on the Lives of the Plaintiff and Others
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Any impact upon other persons by the actions attributable to University Properties is
explained above under the section for Mr. Knapp.
V. The Probability of Future Recurrence of the Misconduct
As noted above, without substantial penalty and intervention, Mr. Knapp is likely to seek
and utilize additional opportunities for fraud. University Properties is a company that Mr. Knapp
has utilized for his real estate activities in the past. Although the most important rehabilitative
impact of punitive damages will be upon Mr. Knapp, himself, the corporation has also misbehaved
through Mr. Knapp and should bear some of the responsibility. The Court notes, in particular,
that Mr. Knapp made careful distinction between activities he took as an "agent" and activities of
the corporation such as purchase and sale of the building.
VI. The Relationship of the Parties
Except to re-state that University Properties is completely dominated and controlled by
Mr. Knapp and to refer to the relationships section for Mr. Knapp, no additional evidence on this
point was presented at trial.
VII. The Amount of Actual Damages Awarded
The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages for University Properties was 1
to 14.
Summary: University Properties
In reviewing the Crookston factors with regard to University Properties, it is difficult and
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not particularly helpful to separate the corporationfromthe conduct of Richard Knapp. While
there was no evidence to justify piercing the corporate veil and disregarding that corporate entity,
the misbehavior of the corporation completely resultedfromthe mis-deeds of Mr. Knapp. The is
some need for a message of rehabilitation to be given to the company but not at a ratio to
compensatory damages of 14 to 1. This Court concludes that punitive damages to the
corporation in the approved ratio of 3 to 1, or $214,000.00 is more reasonable. Accordingly, a
remittitur to the punitive damages judgment against University Properties of $786,000.00 will be
allowed to reduce the total punitive damage award against that corporation to $214,000.00.
The Haws Companies
The jury awarded damages against The Haws Companies as follows:
Fraud or negligent misrepresentation:

$71,336.00

Additional damages as a proximate result of negligence:

$16,250.00

Money received through violation of UCA 61-2-11

$4,200.00

Punitive Damages

$130,500.00

The damages awarded forfraudor negligent misrepresentation are joint and several with
the other defendants. The additional damages proximately resultingfromnegligence are
apportioned from a total of $65,000.00, reduced as noted above. After receiving the verdict the
Plaintiffs elected to receive punitive damages rather than an award based upon the money received
through a violation of U.C.A. section 61-2-11. Interest accrues on the various amounts at the
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statutory rate of interest (7.670% per annum).
The ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages, consistent with the analysis
already employed, is about 1 to 1.5 ($87,586.00 to $130,500.00). The punitive award represents
exactly 25% of the net worth established for the Haws Companies by expert testimony which is
also the percentage of responsibility for the total negligence determined by the jury. The ratio is
well within the established Supreme Court no further analysis of the award is necessary.
Nevertheless, a brief review of the Crookston factors relative to the Haws Company may also be
valuable in the event this award is considered.
I. The Relative Wealth of the Haws Companies
All that can be said of the Haws Companies' relative wealth is that the company is worth
less than Mr. Knapp. The company had an office in Salt Lake, wanted an office in Provo and, for
a time, managed a development near Mr. Knapp's office in Provo. None of that informs as to the
relative wealth of the Haws Companies. The company's net worth was $522,000.00.
II. The Nature of the Alleged Misconduct
The Haws Companies, through it's owner Mr. Haws, hired Mr. Turner in spite of a
somewhat checkered status with the State of Utah. They allowed Mr. Knapp to "hang his
license" solely to gain time but not to foster, train and guide as a real estate agent moved to
becoming a real estate broker. They were willing to associate with him to collect fees and
participate in his real estate business as a principal. When confronted with the misconduct their
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most significant response was to demand their share of any commission andfireMr. Turner and
Mr. Knapp. They made no attempt whatsoever to rectify the injustice created by thefraudof
their agents.
HI. The Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Conduct
As above, the facts and circumstances surrounding the conduct are largely
indistinguishablefromthe conduct, itself. The simple conclusion is that the Haws Companies
neglected to keep the faith with the public they assumed by becoming a real estate brokerage firm.
A negligent, distant company combined with aggressive and less than ethical agents resulted in a
fraud which they failed to rectify upon discovery.
IV. The Effect on the Lives of the Plaintiff and Others
There is no additional information, beyond that discussed above, about the effect of the
conduct of the Haws Companies upon the lives of others.
V. The Probability of Future Recurrence of the Misconduct
The Haws Companies are in the business of dealing in real estate. The company has taken
it upon itself to recruit, supervise and train real estate professionals. The company continues to
be licensed and regulated by the State of Utah. If allowed to engage in these practices without
penalty, the possibility for a recurrence of this or similar type of harmfromagents of the Haws
Company is certainly possible or likely.
VI. The Relationship of the Parties
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As noted above, the Haws Companies allowed itself to be used and manipulated by Mr.
Knapp and Mr. Turner to facilitate thefraudperpetrated upon the Plaintiff The relationship was
an important part of the deception used to shield the undisclosed profit. Mr. Turner was in the
business of marketing real estate because Haws Company contracted with him for that purpose.
VII. The Amount of Actual Damages Awarded
As noted above, the ratio of compensatory damages to punitive damages is approximately
1 to 1.5.
Summary: The Haws Company
The award in this case does not exceed the approved ratio. Although the conduct of the
Haws Companies was, at the time of the actualfraud,relatively benign and without malice, the
company did not take advantage of an opportunity to correct an error but, instead acted to
protect it's "fee position" by seeking to collect real estate commissions andfirethe agents. The
award is 25% of the company's net worth making the possibility of bankruptcyfromthe award
remote. This Court concludes that the jury determination of punitive damages against the Haws
Company was appropriate and will not authorize a further remittitur of that amount.
Conclusion
In summary, this Court concludes that the evidence available to support an award of
damages proximately cause by the negligence of the defendants must be reduced by $145,000.00
to $65,000.00. Thefrauddamages are supportable by evidence of $70,000.00 increased price
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from the misrepresentations and deceit of the defendants and $1,333.00 charged for a loan also
created throughfraudulentconduct of the defendants. The Court has concluded that punitive
damages awarded against Gilbert R Turner, Richard Knapp and University Properties were
excessive. Remittiturs of $2,041,743.00 to the punitive award against Mr. Turner, $1,250,000.00
to the punitive award against Mr. Knapp and $786,000.00 to the punitive award against
University Properties are authorized. The award against the Haws Companies is not found to be
excessive and no remittitur will be allowed. Counsel for the Defendants is instructed to prepare
appropriate modified judgments showing the reduced awards to be submitted to counsel for the
Plaintiff for approval as to form. The Plaintiff, as explained in CrookstorL supra at note 31 on
page 813, may then elect to accept the reduced judgment or re-try this matter against Defendants
Gilbert R. Turner, Richard Knapp and University Properties.
Dated this 12th day of Jun<

Judge James R Taylor
Fourth Judicial District

£2.
[ft/.

A certificate of mailing is on the following page.
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Diversified Holding Co., Ltd. v. Gilbert R. Turner, et al.: 930400136. Memorandum
Decision of June 12,2000.
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Blake S. Atkin
Scott M. Lilja
Jonathan L. Hawkins
Atkin & Lilja, P.C.
136 South Main, Suite 810
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Counsel for the Defendant:
F. Richards Smith
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Jeffrey N.Walker
D. Miles Holman
Daniel F. Van Woerkom
Holman Walker & Hutchings, L.C.
9527 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070
Mailed this h\

day ofL_^4A^AX^2000. postage pre-paid as noted above.
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not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other e n c u m b r a n c e s of any nature shall
ught current on or before closing; a n d (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, a n d appliances shall b e sound or in
ctory working condition at closing. , : 1 ^ f
..f]i -^
- v
, v,,
O N D I T I O N O F W E L L . Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided a n adquate supply of water
Jed use of the well or Wells is authorized b y a state permit or other legal water right. ••-?"-»'=• ^
' I
. - >^-&
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O N D I T I O N O F S E P T I C T A N K . Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's Knowledge, in good working order and Seller
knowledge o f a n y needed= repairs and It meets all applicable government health and construction standards. ,._;.,
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X E L E R A T I O N C L A U S E . Not less than five (5) days, prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification a s to whether or not any notes, mortgages,
of trust orreal[estateI contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instrument(s) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise
>rest rate a ^ p r j d e c l a r e the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the s a m e or unconditionally
B j h e sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case?
lest money received under this Agreement shall b e returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said " D u e on S a l e " clause are set fortfr
ion Therein;" 'alternatives allowed herein shall become null a n d void.
,
•. •-;* '<•;?
-%< • •*- • '* •• • ••:«v-|j-; •)••• ,
;,
J
L T L E I N S P E C T I O N . Not less than five (5) days prior to closing, Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with a n attorney's opinion
jliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title.
fter, Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree[ closing, this Agreement shall b e null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall b e returned to the respective parties.
>:
TLB I N S U R A N C E . If title insurance is elected, Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued
i title insurance.company as Seller shall designate^Title policy to b e issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and
u m b r a n c e s j ^ d e f e c t s e x c e p t e d under.the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made s o insurable through a n escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money
iless Buye^i^ects to waive such defects or encumbrances, b e refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon b e terminated." Seller agrees to pay any}
ition charge]•*'"::'"
• :"
!"•'•:••:--1-- ...'*^.
}'
- .•; •
, « , ::
.•'..•'••; * i . . . - ^ _ . ; . _ : _ . #
STING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases, Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing
)f all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer uTSeller or Seller's agent prior
jfl/'Buyer shaH take title subject to such leases. If the objection(s) is not remedied at or prior to closing, this Agreement shall be'nuirand void, -i.;'
iNGES PURINGjr^NSACTION. Dur^ the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that ho changes in any existing leases shall be made, norjnew le-- "^
into, nor shall, any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. '• 9
'
ji:1!" •
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:orporation. partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, 1

UTH08ITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Selle
her Authority to dc> so and to bind Buyer or S.

'son executing this Agreement on its benalf warrants

OMPLETE AGREEMENTS—NO ORALTAGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the"parties and supersedes anBcancbfs ^ny5
prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect thls-agree^
This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties.
" ' .'•••f-l^v
:OUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and, if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreer
pressly modified or excluded therein.
EFAULT/1NTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages
istitute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or if this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition
tingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to
Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses,
ng a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ape law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an inider action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the
it money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the Interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall
irpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's
curred by the principal broker, in bringing such a c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . .
.BROGATION! Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement.
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ISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property, shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between
le hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent
of the purchase price of the property, Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property
^closing or.declare this Agreement nulhand void, ^damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair
ace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed.
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IME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes?
od, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing
lall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter,,
of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and
ed by ail parties to the transaction.'&$•&•v \1- .*•; Q ? : ; /v.
: r
;:~:r^.
LOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (V2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing
lurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest
umed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer

EAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those exvherein/lf this "Agreement is for'sale or transfer of a~Selle>'s interest under an existing real estate contract, Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deedj
ling SeHer's assignment^of said contract in form sufficient to_convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing r«aJ
contract'thele^
"
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y\ICE. Unless 6therwis^rovided*mThi^
expressly required by it must be glven'nb later than twadays after the occurrence or non-occurrence
ayent with respect to whicli notice Is .required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with'respect to which the notice was to be given;

i, Brokerage shal mean the respectiveilistmg or selling real estate officer
— - " shall meanjbusmess pr working daysexclusive of'legal holidays.;*:'.:
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
FOR
FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED CONTRACT CLAIMS

CONTRACT
Induced by
Fraud

amages

RESCIND

AFFIRM

TORT
CLAIMS

CONTRACT
CLAIMS

Fraud

Reformation

Negligence

Breach of Contract

1
Business Interference Torts

Unjust Enrichment
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#

CASE NAME
(Newest to Oldest)
Half v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
959 P2d 109 (Utah 1998).

TRrAL COURT
JUDGMENT
PONITIVE\ACTtJAL
RATIO

APPELLATE
COURT
PUNITTV£\ACT*

REASONING

$25,000\$19,800
1.2\1

Affirmed

Within established range

$4,000,000\$815.826
4.9U

Affirmed

Trial Court weighed the
factors

$1,800,000\$2,405,022
1\1.3

Affirmed

Within established range

$4,000,000\$815,826
4.9\1

Remanded for
redetermination

Punitive damages
presumptively excessive

$37,000\$250
I48\I

$12,500\$250
50\l

Punitive damages remitted,
grossly excessive

$500,000\$487.200
1.2\1

Affirmed

1\1 not excessive

$100,000\$ 1,234
81\1

Remanded for
redetermination

Punitive damages grossly
disproportionate

$200,000\$400,000

Affirmed

!4\1 not excessive

2

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange,
860 P.2d 937 (1993) (Crookston II)."

*>

Ong International Inc. v. 11th Avenue
Corporation, 850 P.2d 447 (1993).

4

Crookston v. Fire Insurance. Exchange,
81 7 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) (Crookston I).

5

Van Dyke v. Min. Coin Machine Distrs., Inc.,
758 P.2d 962 (Utah App. 1988).

6

Von Hake v. Thomas,
705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985).

7

Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702
P.2d 98 (Utah 1985).

8.

Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co.,
701 P. 2d 1106 (Utah 1985)

9

Bundy v. ( enlury Equipment Company, Inc.,
692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984).

$25,000\$2.133
11.72\1

Remanded for
redetermination

11.7\1 grossly excessive

10

Cruz \>. Montoya,
660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983).

$12,000\$9000
1.3\1

$6000\$9000
.75\1

Punitive damages remitted
as excessive

11

First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J
Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982).

$100,000\$25.000
3\1

$50,000\$25,000
2\1

Punitive damages remitted
as excessive

Demonstrative Aid No. 5
May 26, 2000 Hearing on Post-Trial Motions
Diversified Holding, I..C v. Turner, et A I.
Civil No. 930400136
Judge James Taylor
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1999FL-0434/001

01-27-99 DRAFT

1

JUDGMENT LIEN AMENDMENTS

2

1999 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION OF

5

JUDGMENT LIENS WHICH ARE APPEALED UPON THE FILING OF ADEQUATE

6

SECURITY; AND MAKING TECHNICAL CHANGES.

7

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:

8

AMENDS:

9
10

78-22-1, as last amended by Chapter 327, Laws of Utah 1998
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

11

Section 1. Section 78-22-1 is amended to read:

12

78-22-1. Duration of judgment -- Judgment as lien upon real property - Abstract

13
14
15

of judgment - Small claims judgment not lien - Appeal of judgment
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless
enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law.

16

(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by [Subsection] Subsections (4) and (5). the

17

entry of judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not

18

exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, located in the

19

county in which the judgment is entered.

20

(3) Prior to and after July 1,1997, an abstract ofjudgment issued by the court in which the

21

judgment is entered may be recorded in any court of this state and shall have the same force and

22

effect as a judgment entered in that court.

23

(4) Prior to July 1,1997, and after May 15,1998, a judgment entered in the small claims

24

division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the civil

25

division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3).

26

(5) If any judgment is appealed and the judgment debtorfilesan undertaking with the court

27

hearing the appeal to secure the full amount of the judgment in a form and amount approved bv

28

the court, the lien created bv Subsection (2) shall be terminated.
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S) Tn me event anv presentlv existing or future judgment has been or is appealed
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1

JUDGMENT LIEN AMENDMENTS

2

1999 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

AN ACT RELATING TO THE JUDICIAL CODE; PROVIDING FOR THE TERMINATION OF

5

JUDGMENT LIENS WHICH ARE APPEALED UPON THE FILING OF ADEQUATE

6

SECURITY; AND MAKING TECHNICAL CHANGES.

7

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:

8

AMENDS:

9

78-22-1, as last amended by Chapter 327, Laws of Utah 1998

10

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

11

Section 1. Section 78-22-1 is amended to read:

12

78-22-1. Duration of judgment - Judgment as lien upon real property - Abstract

13
14
15

of judgment - Small claims judgment not lien -- Appeal of judgment
(1) Judgments shall continue for eight years unless previously satisfied or unless
enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with law.

16

(2) Prior to July 1, 1997, except as limited by [Subsection] Subsections (4) and (5). the

17

entry of judgment by a district court is a lien upon the real property of the judgment debtor, not

18

exempt from execution, owned or acquired during the existence of the judgment, located in the

19

county in which the judgment is entered.

20

(3) Prior to and after July 1,1997, an abstract of judgment issued by the court in which the

21

judgment is entered may be recorded in any court of this state and shall have the same force and

22

effect as a judgment entered in that court.

23

(4) Prior to July 1,1997, and after May 15,1998, a judgment entered in the small claims

24

division of any court shall not qualify as a lien upon real property unless abstracted to the civil

25

division of the district court and recorded in accordance with Subsection (3).

26

(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit with the clerk of the court where the

27

appeal isfiledof cash or other security in a form and amount considered sufficient by the court to

28

secure the full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other anticipated

29

damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal, the lien created by Subsection (2)

30

shall be terminated as provided in Subsection (5)(b).

31

(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a). the court shall

32

enter an order terminating the Machine-generated
lien created byOCR,
the may
judgment
under Subsection (2) and granting the
contain errors.
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(5) (a) If any judgment is appealed, upon deposit with the clerk of the court where the
appeal is filed of cash or other security in a form and amountdeemed^ufficient by the court to
secure the full amount of the judgment, together with ongoing interest and any other anticipated
damages or costs, including attorney's fees and costs on appeal the lien created by Subsection (2)
shall be terminated as provided in Subsection (5)(b).
(b) Upon the deposit of sufficient security as provided in Subsection (5)(a), the court
shall enter an order terminating the lien created by the judgment under Subsection (2) and
granting the judgment creditor a perfected lien in the deposited security as of the date of the
original judgment.
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Legislative Review Note
as of 1-28-99 10:23 AM
A limited legal review of this legislation raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns.
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel
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APPENDIX "H

The following are damage calculations reflecting the three possible outcomes if any of
the claims made by appellants are sustained on appeal

No Fraud Damages

Defendant

19

Fraud
(J&S)

Punitive

Ratio
<c to b)

:

e;
Negligence

Total (b+c+e)

Turner

$26,000.00

$26,000.00 J

Knapp

$22,750.00

$22,750.00

University

$-0-

$-0-

Haws

$16,250.00

$16,250.00

, Total:

19

''.'•''""'

--'I.-,

k/'••'*

'

\ * , ,'-:.,,; , / -

;

$65,000.00 :: $65,000,00

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.
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' - / - a.
Defendant

ilillillillllliip

Fraud Damages but no Double Recovery against Knapp and University
."

r V c . ' ::-'•-•;

• / • •

Punitive;
(Allocated)21

dRatio
(ctob)

e.
Negligence

Total (b+c+e)

f.

Turner

$71,336.00

$35,424.00

$26,000.00

$97,336.00

Knapp

$71,336.00

$85,050.00

$22,750.00

$94,086.00

University

$71,336.00

-0-

$71,336.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$20,943.00

$16,250.00

$87,586.00

$142,672.00; '.. ,2'tp;i';.;

$65,000,00

\i- Total; . $71,336.00

20

/ $279,008

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.

21

Punitive damages are allocated here in the same ratio that the trial judge
allocated punitive damages amongst the defendants.
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c.
Fraud Damages but Includes Double Recovery against Knapp and University
a.
Defendant

b.
Fraud22
(J&S)

Punitive
(Allocated)23

Turner

$71,336.00

Knapp

e.
Negligence

f.
Total (b+c+e)

$28,223.00

$26,000.00

$125,559.00

$71,336.00

$67,761.00

$22,750.00

$161,847.00

University

$71,336.00

$29,002.00

$-0-

$100,338.00

Haws

$71,336.00

$17,686.00

$16,250.00

$105,272.00

Total:

$71,336.00

$142,672,00

$65,000.00

$279,008.00

22

Ratio
(otob>

2tol

This amount is joint and several with all defendants.

23

Punitive damages are allocated here in the same ratio that the trial judge
allocated punitive damages amongst the defendants.
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